The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
544.
Mr Levitte
observed that the outcome of past UN inspections had been
“very
positive.
UNSCOM had destroyed more WMD between 1991 and 1998 than
military
operations
in 1991”, and: “In 1998, the IAEA believed it had succeeded in
dismantling
the Iraqi
nuclear programme. It was not the inspections that failed, but the
international
community’s
ability to enforce its decisions in a sufficiently firm and united
manner.”
He added
that France was “fully disposed to support measures strengthening
the
inspection
regime, insofar as that proves necessary to facilitate the
inspectors’ work”.
But it
rejected “measures that would … multiply the risk of incidents
without improving
the
effectiveness” of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. In addition, France “also
set store” on the
“multinational,
independent nature of the inspectors” and any measure which
countered
that “would
be tantamount to repeating past mistakes”. The Council should be
guided
in its
choices by Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei.
545.
Addressing the
role of the Council, Mr Levitte stated that France
attached
“importance
to the principle of collective security”. That was why it was
proposing a
two‑stage
approach. In the first, the Council “should adopt a resolution
clearly stating the
‘rules of
the game’”. It would “define the inspection regime with a view to
ensuring the
inspectors”
could “accomplish their mission fully and without any hindrance”.
It “should
also send a
clear warning to Iraq” that the Council would “not tolerate new
violations”.
546.
In the second
stage, if the inspectors observed that Iraq was “refusing
to
co‑operate
fully” with them, the Council “would meet immediately to decide on
the
appropriate
measures to take, without ruling anything out a
priori”.
547.
France’s view
was that such an approach, which was also the one
proposed
by Mr Annan
in his statement to the Council, was “the only one” that could
offer “unity,
cohesion,
fairness and legitimacy”. Unity of the Council was “absolutely
vital”. In the
past Iraq
had “taken advantage of divisions … to renege on its obligations
and defy
the Council’s
authority”:
“Only a
united front will convince it not to repeat this error. Only a
two‑stage
approach
will allow us to preserve our Council’s unity; any kind of
‘automaticity’
in the
use of force will profoundly divide us.
“The
two‑stage approach is, rather, the choice of cohesion. United in
sending Iraq
a message
of firmness in an initial resolution, the Security Council will, we
have no
doubt,
remain united to assume all of its responsibilities during the
second stage,
should Iraq
violate its commitments.”
548.
Mr Levitte
added that the Council “should also demonstrate fairness by
showing
Iraq that
war is not inevitable if it fully and scrupulously fulfils its
obligations”. That would
“open the
way to the suspension then lifting of sanctions in accordance with
Security
Council
resolutions”. Given the “gravity of the situation”, it was
“essential for the Security
Council to
stay in charge of the process every step of the way”. That was
“fundamental
for the
legitimacy of our action and essential for maintaining unanimous
support for our
common
objectives”.
298