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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
544.  Mr Levitte observed that the outcome of past UN inspections had been “very
positive. UNSCOM had destroyed more WMD between 1991 and 1998 than military
operations in 1991”, and: “In 1998, the IAEA believed it had succeeded in dismantling
the Iraqi nuclear programme. It was not the inspections that failed, but the international
community’s ability to enforce its decisions in a sufficiently firm and united manner.”
He added that France was “fully disposed to support measures strengthening the
inspection regime, insofar as that proves necessary to facilitate the inspectors’ work”.
But it rejected “measures that would … multiply the risk of incidents without improving
the effectiveness” of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. In addition, France “also set store” on the
“multinational, independent nature of the inspectors” and any measure which countered
that “would be tantamount to repeating past mistakes”. The Council should be guided
in its choices by Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei.
545.  Addressing the role of the Council, Mr Levitte stated that France attached
“importance to the principle of collective security”. That was why it was proposing a
two‑stage approach. In the first, the Council “should adopt a resolution clearly stating the
‘rules of the game’”. It would “define the inspection regime with a view to ensuring the
inspectors” could “accomplish their mission fully and without any hindrance”. It “should
also send a clear warning to Iraq” that the Council would “not tolerate new violations”.
546.  In the second stage, if the inspectors observed that Iraq was “refusing to
co‑operate fully” with them, the Council “would meet immediately to decide on the
appropriate measures to take, without ruling anything out a priori”.
547.  France’s view was that such an approach, which was also the one proposed
by Mr Annan in his statement to the Council, was “the only one” that could offer “unity,
cohesion, fairness and legitimacy”. Unity of the Council was “absolutely vital”. In the
past Iraq had “taken advantage of divisions … to renege on its obligations and defy
the Council’s authority”:
“Only a united front will convince it not to repeat this error. Only a two‑stage
approach will allow us to preserve our Council’s unity; any kind of ‘automaticity’
in the use of force will profoundly divide us.
“The two‑stage approach is, rather, the choice of cohesion. United in sending Iraq
a message of firmness in an initial resolution, the Security Council will, we have no
doubt, remain united to assume all of its responsibilities during the second stage,
should Iraq violate its commitments.”
548.  Mr Levitte added that the Council “should also demonstrate fairness by showing
Iraq that war is not inevitable if it fully and scrupulously fulfils its obligations”. That would
“open the way to the suspension then lifting of sanctions in accordance with Security
Council resolutions”. Given the “gravity of the situation”, it was “essential for the Security
Council to stay in charge of the process every step of the way”. That was “fundamental
for the legitimacy of our action and essential for maintaining unanimous support for our
common objectives”.
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