4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
204.
Commenting on
Iraqi demonstrations against the inspectors at a number of
sites,
Dr Blix
told the Security Council:
“Demonstrations
and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq
without
initiative
or encouragement from the authorities … They do not facilitate an
already
difficult
job … Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they can
take it up
in a calmer
and less unpleasant manner.”
205.
In his memoir,
Dr Blix wrote:
“There were
some cases of demonstrations against the inspectors, though
hardly
threatening
ones. They occurred at our Baghdad office, at a hospital site and
during
the
inspection of the private home that yielded nuclear
documents.”85
206.
Dr
ElBaradei reported that the IAEA had found no evidence that Iraq
had
revived its
nuclear weapons programme but it was still investigating a
number
of issues.
207.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that the IAEA had conducted 139 inspections at
some
106 locations,
with a “focus on areas of concern identified by other States,
facilities
identified
through satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed
since 1998,
and other
inspection leads identified independently”. They had been able to
“gain ready
access and
to clarify the nature of the activities” at those facilities. “No
prohibited nuclear
activities”
had been identified.86
208.
Iraq’s
unsuccessful attempts to procure high-strength aluminium tubes
which
Iraq had
indicated were related to a programme to reverse-engineer
conventional
rockets,
had been a particular focus. The IAEA had concluded that the tubes
“would be
consistent
with” use in a conventional rocket programme. They “would not be
suitable
for
manufacturing centrifuges” without modification. The IAEA was
“still investigating” the
issue, but
the attempt to acquire such tubes was “prohibited” by resolution
687 (1991).
209.
The IAEA was
investigating how “dual-use” material had been relocated or
used,
including
the “HMX”87
explosive
which had been removed from IAEA seals at the end of
1998. Dr
ElBaradei stated that it would be difficult to verify how that had
been used.
210.
The IAEA was
investigating reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium but it did
“not
have enough
information, and … would appreciate more”.
211.
Iraq had not
provided “any new information relevant to … questions which
had
been
outstanding since 1998”; but those questions did “not constitute
unresolved
disarmament
issues”.
85
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc, 2005.
86
UN Press
Release, 27 January 2003, Security
Council briefed by Chief UN Weapons Experts on First
60 days of
Inspections in Iraq (SC/7644).
87 A
high explosive used to help trigger nuclear fission.
331