6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

1068.  Mr Blair wrote to Mr Barzani and Mr Talabani on 12 March 2003 and again on

17 March in response to concerns they had raised about regional security in northern

Iraq.454 In the letter of 17 March, Mr Blair stated that he knew from the meeting in

December 2002 that Mr Barzani and Mr Talabani shared the UK’s “vision of an Iraq

which has a genuinely representative government and where there are greater human

rights for all Iraqi people, greater liberties and greater democracy”.

1069.  During a meeting with Mr Blair at No.10 on 17 March, Dr Salih said that it would

be important to hand over quickly to the Iraqi people as much of the running of Iraq as

possible, but that he did not want the UK and US military to leave early.455

1070.  Concerns about ORHA continued to grow as ORHA staff deployed from

Washington to Kuwait in the days immediately before the invasion.

1071.  FCO officials expressed concern about the small number of civilians

working for an organisation that was expected to be responsible for the initial

post-conflict civil administration of Iraq.

1072.  On his way to Kuwait, Maj Gen Cross gave Mr Blair a clear picture of the

inadequate state of post-conflict plans.

1073.  ORHA staff left Washington for Kuwait on 16 March.456 The inter-agency tensions

that had hampered post-conflict planning in the US were soon compounded by new

logistical obstacles. Although Gen Franks had placed ORHA under the operational

command of Gen McKiernan’s CFLCC, when Lt Gen Garner’s advance party arrived at

CFLCC headquarters, there was no space available for them. Post-conflict planners in

ORHA, JTF-4 and CENTCOM were soon scattered across five locations in Kuwait, the

US and Qatar.

1074.  Maj Gen Cross deployed to Kuwait on 18 March, travelling via London.457

1075.  In his written statement to the Inquiry, Maj Gen Cross said that while in London

he briefed Mr Blair:

“I was as honest about the position as I could be, essentially briefing that I did not

believe post-war planning was anywhere near ready. I told him that there was no

clarity on what was going to be needed after the military phase of the operation,

nor who would provide it. Although I was confident that we would secure a military

victory I offered my view that we should not begin that campaign until we had a

much more coherent post-war plan.”458

454 Letter Blair to Barzani and Talabani, 12 March 2003, [untitled]; Letter Blair to Barzani and Talabani,

17 March 2003, [untitled].

455 Letter Rycroft to Owen, 17 March 2003, ‘Northern Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Salih, 17 March’.

456 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

457 Statement Cross, 2009, page 15.

458 Statement, 2009, page 15.

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