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3.1  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002
although Iraq would not make the first move and the initiative would have to
come from the UN; and
accepted that the time had come for Iraq to start talking about the return of
inspectors and asked Mr Moussa to contact Dr Blix on his behalf.197
411.  Mr Powell drew the telegram to Mr Blair’s attention, commenting:
“This ties in with other indications that Saddam is wriggling, trying to get off the
hook. The US will want to ignore these talks and keep open the possibility of
regime change instead of inspectors.”198
412.  Mr Blair responded: “We shd keep up the pressure.”199
Conclusions
413.  After the attacks on the US on 9/11, which was widely accepted as having
changed the nature of the threat and the way in which Governments should
address calculations about the risks being faced, Mr Blair declared that the
UK would stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the US to defeat and eradicate
international terrorism.
414.  Throughout the autumn of 2001, Mr Blair took an active and leading role in
building a coalition to act against that threat, including military action against
Al Qaida and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. He also emphasised the potential
risk of terrorists acquiring and using a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon,
and the dangers of inaction.
415.  In November 2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq had played no role in the
9/11 attacks on the US and that practical co-operation between Iraq and Al Qaida
was unlikely. There was no credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD-related
technology and expertise to terrorist groups. It was possible that Iraq might use
WMD in terrorist attacks, but only if the regime was under serious and imminent
threat of collapse.
416.  In relation to Iraq, Mr Blair sought to influence US policy and prevent
precipitate military action by the US which would undermine the success
of the coalition which had been established for action against international
terrorism. He recommended identifying an alternative policy which would
command widespread international support.
197  Telegram 21 Cairo to FCO London, 24 January 2002, ‘Iraq/Arab League: Moussa’s Visit to Baghdad’.
198  Manuscript comment Powell to Prime Minister, [undated], on Telegram 21 Cairo to FCO London,
24 January 2002, ‘Iraq/Arab League: Moussa’s Visit to Baghdad’.
199  Manuscript comment Prime Minister to Powell, [undated], on Telegram 21 Cairo to FCO London,
24 January 2002, ‘Iraq/Arab League: Moussa’s Visit to Baghdad’.
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