3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
although
Iraq would not make the first move and the initiative would have
to
come from
the UN; and
•
accepted
that the time had come for Iraq to start talking about the return
of
inspectors
and asked Mr Moussa to contact Dr Blix on his
behalf.197
411.
Mr Powell drew
the telegram to Mr Blair’s attention, commenting:
“This ties
in with other indications that Saddam is wriggling, trying to get
off the
hook. The
US will want to ignore these talks and keep open the possibility
of
regime change
instead of inspectors.”198
412.
Mr Blair
responded: “We shd keep up the pressure.”199
413.
After the
attacks on the US on 9/11, which was widely accepted as
having
changed the
nature of the threat and the way in which Governments
should
address
calculations about the risks being faced, Mr Blair declared that
the
UK would
stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the US to defeat and
eradicate
international
terrorism.
414.
Throughout
the autumn of 2001, Mr Blair took an active and leading role
in
building a
coalition to act against that threat, including military action
against
Al Qaida
and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. He also emphasised the
potential
risk of
terrorists acquiring and using a nuclear, biological or chemical
weapon,
and the
dangers of inaction.
415.
In November
2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq had played no role in
the
9/11 attacks
on the US and that practical co-operation between Iraq and Al
Qaida
was
unlikely. There was no credible evidence of covert transfers of
WMD-related
technology
and expertise to terrorist groups. It was possible that Iraq might
use
WMD in
terrorist attacks, but only if the regime was under serious and
imminent
threat of
collapse.
416.
In relation
to Iraq, Mr Blair sought to influence US policy and
prevent
precipitate
military action by the US which would undermine the
success
of
the coalition which had been established for action against
international
terrorism.
He recommended identifying an alternative policy which
would
command
widespread international support.
197
Telegram 21
Cairo to FCO London, 24 January 2002, ‘Iraq/Arab League: Moussa’s
Visit to Baghdad’.
198
Manuscript
comment Powell to Prime Minister, [undated], on Telegram 21 Cairo
to FCO London,
24 January
2002, ‘Iraq/Arab League: Moussa’s Visit to Baghdad’.
199
Manuscript
comment Prime Minister to Powell, [undated], on Telegram 21 Cairo
to FCO London,
24 January
2002, ‘Iraq/Arab League: Moussa’s Visit to Baghdad’.
381