6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

• the importance of transparent use of oil revenues; and

• the need to argue for a level playing field for UK companies on new oil

exploration contracts.

147. In response to a request from Mr Blair, Mr Chaplin provided additional briefing on:

• The humanitarian situation – described as “the one area where US Day After

planning is reasonably advanced”. Mr Chaplin attached a short note from DFID

listing three key issues from a humanitarian and developmental perspective:

{{refining the military options to minimise civilian suffering, damage to

essential services and disruption to existing humanitarian systems;

{{a leading UN role in relief and reconstruction as soon as possible;

{{agreement on affordable financing mechanisms for relief and

reconstruction.77

• Options for a second resolution (see Section 3.6). Mr Chaplin attached a

note from UND suggesting additional material for a second resolution, which

would affirm the Security Council’s willingness to take on the post-conflict

administration of Iraq.78 The proposed material was close to that in resolution

1244 (1999) establishing a UN administration in Kosovo.

• UN involvement in the aftermath, where the UK delegation had made “some

impact” in the talks on 22 January, but which was “only likely to make progress if

the US side gets a signal from the President to take it seriously”.79

148. Mr Chaplin advised that, even if the US remained unwilling to endorse a UN

administration specifically in a second resolution, it might be possible to agree

compromise language, “including reaffirmation of commitment to Iraq’s sovereignty

and territorial integrity, the UN’s readiness to help facilitate a political process to

encourage the development of new institutions, readiness to mobilise resources for

the reconstruction of key infrastructure, protection of human rights, the safe return

of refugees and so on”.

149. In his diaries, Mr Campbell described preparations for the meeting between

Mr Blair and President Bush, including the preparation of a further Note on the strategy

(see Section 3.6).80

150. A four-page document entitled ‘Countdown’ appears in the No.10 files for

30 January 2003.81

77 Paper DFID, 30 January 2003, ‘Briefing for Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Bush’.

78 Paper UND, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Second Resolution – Additional Elements’.

79 Letter Sinclair to Rycroft, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s visit to Camp David, 31 January:

Additional Briefing’ attaching Paper Chaplin, 30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Camp David,

31 January: Iraq’.

80 Campbell A & Stott R. The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries. Hutchinson, 2007.

81 Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], ‘Countdown’.

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