8 | The
invasion
the
oilfields and Umm Qasr and to isolate Basra. He added: “They don’t
see the causal
linkage
between Basra and Baghdad.”
339.
In response to
a comment from Sir David Manning that Basra was “vital for
hearts
and minds”,
Mr Blair said that “symbolic acts” were important now that the
strategy was
“steady
advance not shock and awe”.
340.
In his diary
for 31 March, Mr Campbell wrote that “both CDS and C [were]
more
hopeful” at
the morning meetings; and that Mr Blair had seen Adm Boyce
“and a general
from the
campaign” later.187
Mr Blair
had “got more talking direct to the general than he
had from
weeks of meetings. The truth was that the military and intelligence
campaigns
had not
been wholly successful.”
341.
Mr Scarlett
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 1 April that the Shia holy
sites
at Karbala
and Najaf could be at risk of attack, with the blame being laid on
Coalition
Forces to
alienate the Shia population.188
342.
Adm Boyce
reported that the battle with the Republican Guard south of
Baghdad
was getting
under way. In the South, signs of normality were returning to the
towns in
British
hands. The British Division was conducting both high-intensity
operations around
Basra
itself and post-conflict stabilisation operations
elsewhere.
343.
Concluding the
meeting, Mr Blair said that the Coalition needed to make known
its
respect for
the Shia holy sites and our desire to protect them from any damage
by the
regime. As
regards the overall campaign, there were three phases; it was now
in the
second
phase.
344.
Mr Blair
said that to sustain support nationally and internationally, there
was a
need to
upgrade the communication strategy; and he had discussed that with
President
Bush.
Better co-ordination across both Whitehall and the Atlantic would
be put in place
to present
a coherent strategy. The nature of the Iraqi regime had to be
exposed and the
rebuttal
system improved. Messages about the future representative
government in Iraq
and human
rights protection had to be conveyed to the Iraqi people and more
widely.
Resources
and the full co-operation of government departments would be
needed
in
providing resources for the communications effort. It was as
important to win the
diplomatic
and political campaign as it was to achieve military
success.
345.
The progress
of the campaign had also been the subject of much debate
in
Washington.
187
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
188
Minutes, 1
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
57