The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

304. The briefing included questions to which “we must first have answers” if the UK

was to contribute along those lines, including whether the US envisaged “sectorisation”

as in Bosnia or “central locations and force projection” as in Afghanistan as the

model for Phase IV Coalition force structure. If sectorisation, would the US provide

additional forces in the UK sector to perform humanitarian tasks for which UK capacity

was limited?

305. After the talks, Mr Lee reported to Mr Hoon that, on the plus side, the US was

beginning to take the post-conflict planning seriously and was willing to work with the

UK and Australia in the various working groups, but there was little time left.110

306. Mr Lee recommended that Mr Hoon raise post-conflict planning in his next phone

conversation with Secretary Rumsfeld, in terms that it was a vital issue that needed

“to be sorted now because it affects both the UK decision to commit to hostilities … and

also international support”, and that there was a need for clarity on “who is responsible

to whom for what on day after planning and then execution”.

307. Those talks and their outcome are addressed in more detail in Section 6.5.

308. The JIC assessed on 29 January that retaining WMD was a vital Iraqi interest

and that Saddam Hussein was unlikely to agree to relinquish power or go into

exile.

309. The JIC predicted that once military action began, widespread lack of loyalty

to the regime would become clear and a hard-fought professional defence of

Baghdad was “unlikely”.

310. The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements

on Iraq’s ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.

311. At the request of the FCO, the JIC produced an Assessment on 29 January

reviewing developments in Iraq from the viewpoint of the Iraqi regime, particularly

Saddam Hussein, and possible Iraqi moves in the coming weeks.111 The Assessment

addressed both the possible response to the obligations set out in resolution 1441 (see

Section 3.6) and Iraq’s potential responses to the military build-up and military action.

312. The Key Judgements included:

• “Saddam does not appear to realise the severity of the military attack he faces.

Senior Iraqi officials, although increasingly convinced of the inevitability of

a US- led attack, are unlikely to be telling Saddam about their concerns.”

110 Minute Lee to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 23 January 2003, ‘Aftermath: Visit to Washington’.

111 JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The Emerging View from Baghdad’.

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