9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
personnel
were withdrawing from Iraq to Kuwait for two weeks, after which
point they
would go on
to the UK.
463.
Mr Wilks
identified two options until the Council of Representatives
returned in late
September
and could again be asked to ratify the agreement:
•
a letter
from the Iraqi Government extending the UK’s previous
security
agreement
for two months; or
•
a letter
from the Iraqi Government creating a new temporary agreement, for
the
UK naval
training team.
464.
Prime Minister
Maliki’s Chief of Staff recommended writing to Prime Minister
Maliki
with these
proposals.
465.
A Cabinet
Office official discussed the options with Mr McDonald on the
same
day, who
considered that an extension of the current agreement was the best
interim
option.188
He asked
that no decision on permanent withdrawal of UK staff be
taken
before the
situation was reviewed at the end of September.
466.
Mr Wilks,
“emphasising the PM’s interest in reaching an interim
agreement”,
delivered a
letter proposing the two interim options to Prime Minister Maliki’s
Chief of
Staff on 29
July.189
He asked
whether the UK would consider bringing its training
under
the
agreement signed between the Iraqi Government and NATO.
Mr Wilks explained
that it
would not be feasible to re-open the NATO agreement.
467.
Mr Wilks
also provided the Cabinet Office with an assessment of the chances
for
a
successful vote in the Council of Representatives in the autumn. He
suggested that
the
prospects looked good – there were indications that a majority of
MPs supported
the agreement,
though also that opponents were consolidating their support. There
was
a risk
that:
“… as
negotiations on electoral alliances continue over Ramadan, the
Sadrists will
make
opposition to our agreement a pre-condition for their joining an
alliance. This
could tip
the balance among MPs against our agreement if the Sadrists were to
join
a large
alliance.”
468.
On 30 July,
Sir John Chilcot formally launched the Iraq
Inquiry.190
The full
text
of
Sir John’s statement can be read on the Inquiry’s website. In
it he emphasised the
Inquiry’s
focus on establishing what happened and identifying what lessons
can be
learned.
Sir John said that hearings would be held in public and
inquisitorial in nature.
188
Email
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Forber, 28 July 2009, ‘Iraq: UK
Defence Agreement –
Next Steps’.
189
Email Wilks
to Cabinet Office [junior official], 29 July 2009, ‘Re: Iraq: UK
Defence Agreement –
Next Steps’.
190
Statement
Chilcot, 30 July 2009, ‘Statement by Sir John Chilcot, Chairman of
the Iraq Inquiry, at a news
conference
on Thursday, 30 July 2009’.
461