3.3 | Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

• The clear prospect of a major attack would put the regime under unprecedented

pressure. But regime cohesion is unlikely to collapse in the absence of a large scale

invasion.

• Saddam relies on a mixture of patronage and extreme fear to retain power and

contain opposition. Real loyalty and support for his regime is confined to the top

of the hierarchy.

• The Special Republican Guard (SRG) and the Republican Guard Forces Command

(RGFC) are more reliable than the Regular Army (RA). All would initially fight a

US‑led attack. Once the regime was perceived as doomed the military’s will to fight

on would be sorely tested.

• Regime disintegration would be most likely if Iraqi ground forces were being

comprehensively defeated; if top military officers could be persuaded that their fate

was not irrevocably tied to that of Saddam; or if Saddam himself were to be killed.

Military units are more likely to suffer mass desertions than revolt as coherent units.”

169. The Assessment also stated:

“Saddam and his regime have proved durable …

“The Iraqi military are aware of their vulnerability to air power, probably their greatest

weakness; their main way of mitigating this is through dispersal, including into

urban areas […] We have only fragmentary intelligence indicating how the regime

might deal with an all-out attack including ground forces. But we assess that only

massive military force could be guaranteed to topple Saddam.”

170. Addressing the policy implications of the Assessment, the JIC stated: “Saddam

and his regime must be convinced that any move to topple him is serious and likely

to succeed before they begin to feel the pressure.”

171. Mr Hoon’s proposal prompted Mr William Nye, Head of the Treasury Defence,

Diplomacy and Intelligence Team, to advise Mr Brown that he should write to the MOD

proposing that all options for UK participation in military operations (including smaller

and more specialised options) should be costed.77 This would enable the Government

to assess how much it wished to devote to securing a degree of influence over US policy

and operations, in terms of risk to UK troops, the opportunity cost of withdrawing from

other operations, and the financial cost.

172. Treasury officials estimated the total military costs of the operation as US$70bn;

and that UK participation on a large scale could cost £2bn or more in the financial year

2002/03.

77 Minute Nye to Bowman, 5 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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