The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
739.
Two options
were being considered; either extending the boundary of a
combined
MND (Centre
South) and MND (Centre) to encompass Muthanna and Dhi Qar or
placing
US troops
under UK command in MND(SE). Gen Dannatt wrote to the Chiefs of
Staff
and senior
officials in the MOD:
“It may be
that we wish to volunteer early to take the US forces under
command, in
order to
shape the direction of our future engagement in Iraq rather than
reduce to a
two-star
controlling a single province.”
740.
Gen Dannatt
also described experiencing in Baghdad and Basra a “palpable
sense
of optimism
… that has to be balanced against the growing realisation that
unless we will
build on
the successes of 2007, we will miss the opportunities that 2008
presents”.
741.
In his weekly
report on 14 January, Lt Gen Rollo commented that although the
final
days of
2007 had “very much the feel of a boat without wind”, there was “a
very different
feel” to
Baghdad at the start of 2008.352
He wrote:
“The emphasis is on politics, and there
are clear
signs of movement.”
742.
Efforts to
counter AQ continued, with a series of MNF operations
against
AQ
strongholds in Baghdad and Diyala. Discussions continued in Baghdad
on the
commercial
plans for the development of Umm Qasr port in Basra. Lt Gen
Rollo
commented:
“This
offers a real opportunity for Basra and the South-East and we need
to ensure
that
contracts are let as quickly as possible … This will require
co-ordination in
Baghdad,
and with the Ministries and the Japan Bank of International
Co-operation.
My team
will continue to track this, but I remain of the view that the real
answer is a
Basra
Development Office in Baghdad.”
743.
Lt Gen Rollo
recorded that US work on the long term US-Iraqi bilateral Status
of
Forces
Agreement (SOFA) had begun in earnest, with a negotiating team due
to arrive in
Iraq in
February.
744.
Lt Gen Rollo
reported that there was provision in the US thinking for
coalition
partners
either to be covered by their agreement, or to adopt its language,
or to
negotiate
their own agreement. He believed that the US was aware that the
European
Convention
on Human Rights imposed particular demands on UK forces and was
keen
to know
what the UK would need in such an agreement. Maj Gen Rollo wrote
that the
SOFA would
cover all aspects of the MNF presence in Iraq and one would be
necessary
regardless
of the size of the UK’s commitment. He felt that: “A clear view on
how we plan
to engage
is overdue.”
352
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 14 January 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (283) 14 Jan
08’.
318