8 | The
invasion
Americans
to move forces to Basra rather than for us to withdraw our
armour
from the
city and send it north.”
298.
Sir David
concluded his minute by considering the political strategy. He
advised
Mr Blair:
“Things may
be better than I think […] But the ‘denouement’ that Condi [Rice]
talked
to me about
yesterday still feels a long way off. We are at a critical moment:
we
need a
‘Mazar-e-Sharif’ turning point. We need to ensure that the military
campaign
is the
means of winning the political argument. Our best chance is to
concentrate
on taking
Basra in the next few days and weeks, and on pacifying the Shia
South.
With the
oil wells working and humanitarian relief in place, we will be able
to show
that we
have liberated an area and that life is steadily improving. People
will then
lose their
fear and speak out. This will help to transform the media
coverage.
“While we
concentrate on Basra, we should get more forces into the North as
quickly
as possible
… Between these southern and northern millstones, we should
patiently
work
against Saddam in Central Iraq. We should move to surround Baghdad,
but
not move to
assault it unless we are very confident that it is ready to fall.
Otherwise
the
military cost will be heavy and the loss of life will be great.
Success at this price
could well
be politically unsustainable.”
299.
The MOD
continued to advise Mr Hoon that the US military did not see
Basra
as
strategically significant.
300.
The US
attached a higher priority to the UK role in providing security for
the
oilfields,
protecting lines of communication and in the retention of Umm
Qasr.
301.
The US
military would be unlikely to review the position until after a
planned
major
engagement with Republican Guard forces, which might not take place
for
several
days.
302.
UK forces
would be continuing raids into Basra and had contingency
plans
if the
situation deteriorated.
303.
Mr David
Johnson, Head of the MOD Iraq Secretariat, submitted advice on
the
Coalition
campaign strategy for Basra, approved by Adm Boyce, to
Mr Hoon’s Private
“US
Commanders (Generals Franks and McKiernan)
•
Are clear
that their main effort is Baghdad, and that they do not have
the
forces to
fight on two fronts at once;
176
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 30 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Basrah – Coalition campaign
strategy’.
51