The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
elections
begs questions about electoral method, constituency
boundaries,
allocation
of seats, political party laws, relationship with Government
[sic]
Council
etc.”
389.
Sir Jeremy
repeated that Ambassador Bremer was not supportive of an
early
handover of
power. He assessed that:
“As long as
the Coalition remains a major presence in Iraq, it is difficult to
see how
it could
cede ultimate authority over policy decisions which would affect
the Security
of the
Coalition Forces, the expenditure of Coalition resources or Iraq’s
commitment
to human
rights, a free market and democracy. If we on the UK side think
differently
because we
judge the Coalition does not have the time and the opportunity to
deliver
these wider
goals, then we have a gap in perceptions and objectives with the US
we
need to
resolve.”
390.
Replying to
Sir Jeremy the following day, Mr Sawers wrote:
“I welcome
your confirmation that the political process we mapped out last
July
remains, in
your and Bremer’s view, achievable. Sticking to that approach would
be
391.
Mr Sawers
explained that the UK’s priority should be to stick to the
timescale
leading to
elections in mid-2004 that he and Ambassador Bremer had
envisaged.
He
added:
“We are
looking at fallback options, including the possibility of the sort
of two stage
transition
that you were advocating earlier this year from New York
…
“We agree
with your conclusion that we should explore this alternative route.
But we
will do so
circumspectly, and only activate it if the existing plan has to be
reviewed.
We are not
at the point where we and the Americans seriously differ; but we
are
more open
than them to considering alternatives, should that be
necessary.”
On 14
September, soldiers of the 1st Queen’s Lancashire Regiment (1 QLR)
arrested
seven Iraqi
citizens including Mr Baha Mousa, a 26 year old hotel
receptionist, at the Hotel
Ibn Al
Haitham in Basra, during an operation to detain a number of
individuals who had
been
identified as former regime loyalists.226
A Public
Inquiry into the circumstances of Mr Mousa’s death on 15
September, and the
treatment
of nine others who were detained with him, was announced in May
2008 and
published
its findings on 8 September 2011.
225
Telegram 71
FCO London to IraqRep, 16 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
226
The Report
of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, 8
September 2011, HC 1452-I, II, III.
272