3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
298.
The FCO
advised that, in that eventuality: “It would obviously be
preferable to have
automatic
authorisation of the use of force” but the Russians and others were
“likely to
insist on a
separate decision”. Armed support for UNMOVIC “would be very
difficult, if
not
impossible to negotiate”.
299.
Such a
resolution would “demonstrate … willingness to give Iraq one last
chance.
But there
would be pressure … to keep to the timetable outlined in …
[resolution] 1284,
which gave
UNMOVIC months rather than weeks to report full Iraqi compliance.”
There
would also
have to be tight criteria for determining whether Iraq was
co‑operating “to
ensure that
there would be no return to Iraq playing cat and mouse with
UNMOVIC”.
300.
The FCO judged
that the UK would be “unlikely to secure language which
provided
a clear
justification for future military action without further recourse
to the UNSC”. It also
pointed out
that, “A failed attempt in this area would be damaging. For this
reason, it
would be
wise not to go for the hardest option.”
301.
Reviewing the
“Prospects and Pitfalls” of action, the FCO concluded that it
would
be
“difficult to negotiate any resolution which implicitly or
explicitly authorises the use of
force
without clear Iraqi provocation”. It identified the Russian
attitude as “pivotal”; and
argued that
China and other Security Council members would be nervous of
setting a
precedent
for “what may look like regime change”.
302.
The FCO also
addressed the need for a trigger to support a resolution
authorising
the use of
force:
“The best
trigger would be if Iraq were to be caught out taking action in
clear
violation
of UN Security Council demands. For example, if we were to get
new
evidence of
an egregious attempt by Iraq to rebuild its WMD programme … But it
is
unlikely
that Iraq will play into our hands in this way.
“The next
best trigger would be to adopt a resolution demanding more
intrusive
inspections
… in the expectation that Iraq would not co‑operate … Iraq’s
refusal
to let
UNMOVIC in or a subsequent report from UNMOVIC of Iraq’s failure
to
co‑operate
would suffice.
“Even
without a specific trigger … we might argue that the UNSC’s
patience had run
out … the
first anniversary of … resolution [1382] (on 29 November [2002])
might be
a useful
opportunity to focus minds.”
303.
Addressing an
ultimatum the FCO advised:
“Various
types of ultimatum are possible. They would need to be linked to
demands
for the
re‑admission of inspectors, and Iraqi co‑operation … Some options
would
include
deadlines … but … in the absence of … Iraqi move[s] to comply
within a
reasonable
(but short) period, they would be in clear violation.”
147