The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

532. In relation to Saddam Hussein’s options for seizing the initiative, the Assessment

stated:

• A “concerted attempt” to bring down an aircraft in one of the No‑Fly Zones was

“a possibility”.

• A pre‑emptive attack on the Kurds or Kuwait was judged “unlikely”.

• Saddam Hussein “would probably … order preparations for a campaign of

terrorism and sabotage in the region”.

• “… we know that Iraqi Special Forces and other organisations, such as the

‘Saddam Fedayeen’, also possess the capability to conduct sabotage or terrorist

attacks.”

• It was “possible that Iraqi terrorist attacks could be conducted against other

[non‑military] interests or the leadership and economic (e.g. oil industry) targets

of regional States”.

• The JIC did not “know enough about Iraqi capabilities to discount the threat

outside the region, including within the UK, though previously Iraqi attempts to

mount terrorist attacks, or engage proxies to do so on their behalf, have been

largely ineffective”.

533. In relation to missile attacks, the Assessment stated:

• “Saddam would probably order missile attacks …”

• Attacks on Israel would be an attempt to attract Israeli retaliation and thus widen

the war, split the Coalition and arouse popular opinion in the Arab States.

• Missiles “could be armed with chemical or biological warfare (CBW) agents”.

• “Saddam might be deterred at least initially by the threat of Israeli nuclear

retaliation.”

• Attacks on coalition forces in Kuwait would require Iraq to deploy short‑range

missiles into the “No Drive Zone”.220

• A pre‑emptive missile attack on Israel was “less likely because it would show

Iraq had been lying about its retention of long range missiles”.

534. The Assessment stated that the JIC had:

“… little insight into how the Iraqi military might plan to fight any ground war … At

present we have little evidence to judge whether Iraq sees urban or guerrilla warfare

as feasible options. Iraqi effectiveness would be mitigated by problems of command

and control, inadequate training and poor morale. We doubt that guerrilla activity

would be very effective; urban warfare is more plausible …”

535. The judgements about Saddam Hussein’s potential use of chemical and biological

weapons are addressed in Section 4.2. The firmness of those judgements, which bear

220 Resolution 949 (1994) imposed a “No Drive Zone” in Iraq south of the 32nd parallel.

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