Executive
Summary
clear
statement” from Dr Blix which allowed the US and UK to argue
that a failure
to pass
a second resolution was in breach of the spirit of 1441, remained
in his view,
overwhelming;
and that inspectors should be given until the end of March or early
April
to carry
out their task.57
152.
Mr Blair
suggested that, in the absence of a “smoking gun”, Dr Blix
would be able
to harden
up his findings on the basis of a pattern of non‑co‑operation from
Iraq and that
that would
be sufficient for support for military action in the Security
Council.
153.
The US and UK
should seek to persuade others, including Dr Blix, that that
was
the “true
view” of resolution 1441.
154.
Mr Blair
used an interview on Breakfast with
Frost on 26 January
to set out the
position
that the inspections should be given sufficient time to determine
whether or
not Saddam
Hussein was co‑operating fully.58
If he was
not, that would be a sufficient
reason for
military action. A find of WMD was not required.
155.
Mr Blair’s
proposed approach to his meeting with President Bush was
discussed
in a
meeting of Ministers before Cabinet on 30 January and then
discussed in general
terms in
Cabinet itself.
156.
In a Note
prepared before his meeting with President Bush on 31 January,
Mr Blair
proposed
seeking a UN resolution on 5 March followed by an attempt to
“mobilise Arab
opinion to
try to force Saddam out” before military action on 15
March.59
157.
When
Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January, it was clear that
the window of
opportunity
before the US took military action would be very short. The
military campaign
could begin
“around 10 March”.60
158.
President Bush
agreed to seek a second resolution to help Mr Blair, but there
were
major
reservations within the US Administration about the wisdom of that
approach.
159.
Mr Blair
confirmed that he was “solidly with the President and ready to do
whatever
it took to
disarm Saddam” Hussein.
160.
Reporting on
his visit to Washington, Mr Blair told Parliament on 3
February 2003
that Saddam
Hussein was not co‑operating as required by resolution 1441 and, if
that
continued,
a second resolution should be passed to confirm such a material
breach.61
161.
Mr Blair
continued to set the need for action against Iraq in the context of
the need
to be seen
to enforce the will of the UN and to deter future
threats.
57
Letter
Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
58
BBC
News, 26
January 2003, Breakfast
with Frost.
59
Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Countdown’.
60
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Bush
on 31
January’.
61
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3
February 2003, columns 21‑38.
23