3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
“Usama Bin
Laden and Al Qaida were able to commit these atrocities because
of
their close
alliance with the Taliban regime [in Afghanistan], which allowed
them
to operate
with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity.”
The
document also stated that:
•
“[F]rom the
early 1990s”, Al Qaida had “sought to acquire nuclear and
chemical
materials
for use as terrorist weapons”.
•
In June 2001,
the US had warned the Taliban that “it had the right to defend
itself
and that it
would hold the regime responsible for attacks against US citizens
by
terrorists
sheltered in Afghanistan”.
•
The “Taliban
regime had responded by saying no evidence existed against
Usama
Bin Laden,
and that neither he nor his network would be
expelled”.
•
When asked in
1998 about obtaining chemical or nuclear weapons, Usama
Bin
Laden had
said “acquiring such weapons for the defence of Muslims [was]
a
religious
duty”.
134.
Mr Tim Dowse,
Head of the FCO Non-Proliferation Department from January
2001
to November
2003, told the Inquiry that the issue of the dossier was “regarded
as a
rather
successful action”.73
135.
The air
campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan began on 7
October.74
136.
Concern
that continuing speculation about further American military
action
against
other states was undermining support for the campaign against Al
Qaida
led Mr
Blair to try to influence President Bush to “deal with” Iraq at a
later date,
including
suggesting that President Bush should avoid debate in public on
the
next steps
until they knew what that might mean.
137.
Following
discussions with leaders in the Middle East, Mr Blair wrote
to
President Bush
on 11 October about the military operation in Afghanistan and
the
pressures
generated by the “War against Terrorism”.75
Mr Blair
described “extending
the war
zone” and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as the “top
flashpoints”.
138.
Mr Blair wrote
that it was time to move to the “next stage of the military
operation
[in
Afghanistan]”, and that it was “hard to see how we do this without
removing the
Taliban”.
139.
In a section
headed “Extending War Aims”, Mr Blair wrote that there was “a
real
willingness
in the Middle East to get Saddam out but a total opposition to
mixing this
up with the
current operation” in Afghanistan. The uncertainty caused by
references to
a “Phase 2”
in the war on terrorism “seeming to extend to Iraq, Syria etc” was
“really
hurting …
because it seems to confirm the UBL propaganda that this is West vs
Arab”.
73
Public
hearing, 25 November 2009 [morning], page 52.
74
The White
House, 7 October 2001, Presidential
Address to the Nation.
75
Letter
Blair to Bush, 11 October 2001, [untitled].
337