The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
(even the
Arabs might see the advantages, provided the end-objective was an
Iraq
for
Iraqis), and of a stronger consensus in the EU and NATO, needs to
be weighed
against all
the lateral implications of the wave we are riding at
present.”
273.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that there was a need to regain the
political
and public
relations initiative.
274.
Mr Blair
was considering the approach to a second resolution.
275.
Mr Blair
had also identified the need to make the case publicly that
the
US and
the UK were making ‘one last push for peace’.
276.
On 12
February, Sir David Manning and Dr Rice discussed the progress
of
inspections,
including the outcome of the visit by Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei to Baghdad.78
Sir David
commented that the inspectors only needed intelligence because Iraq
was
not co-operating.
277.
Sir David
Manning also gave Dr Rice an account of the UK’s current
thinking on a
second
resolution, which he described as “very much work in progress”. He
reported that
Mr Blair
had “yet to take any decisions”; the UK and US now had to regain
the political
and public
relations initiative.
278.
Mr Blair
would be making a major speech that weekend to “set out the
arguments
again, but
to do so in the context of one last pitch for peace”. Mr Blair
“would probably
say that
the time had come to accept that Saddam was in breach of 1441
and
that we
should now table a second resolution insisting that he must go or
face the
consequences”.
Sir David said that the ultimatum need not be in the resolution
itself,
but that
“we must indicate our readiness to allow to Saddam to leave within
a short,
specified
period so offering the chance of avoiding war”.
279.
Sir David also
outlined Mr Blair’s plan to write to Mr Costas Simitis,
the Greek
Prime
Minister in advance of the European Council, and the need to
generate
momentum to
attract support.
280.
Commenting on
the position after the call, Sir David wrote that the UK would
need
to think
further about the timing for tabling the draft resolution over the
next 24 hours.
281.
The UK
decided to continue to explore the possibility of including
an
ultimatum
in the resolution with the US.
282.
The FCO
informed Sir Jeremy Greenstock on 12 February that Ministers
were
“broadly
content” with the draft resolution he had provided the previous day
(following
discussions
on 10 February) but had decided, before receipt of his later
advice, that
78
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 12 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
230