The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

130. Dr Cholerton provided Sir Kevin Tebbit with advice including a copy of the Cabinet

Office ‘Iraq: Options Paper’ and Mr Webb’s minute of 27 February.65 Dr Cholerton wrote:

“… we believe that the key issue for the PM to raise with President Bush is the

outcome the US would seek from any military action: would it simply be [to] control

Iraq’s WMD, remove Saddam from office (in the knowledge that a successor regime

may well continue with Iraq’s WMD programmes) or is it necessary to install a

replacement regime? The answer to this question will be key to military planning;

how action would fit into the framework of international law and help hugely in

subsequent work to influence US policy.”

131. Lord Boyce initially told the Inquiry:

“We had started thinking of what our capability would be. I was not involved in the

briefing of the Prime Minister just before going to Crawford.”66

132. In his later statement, Lord Boyce said:

“There was a meeting with the Prime Minister on 2 April just prior to his visit to

Crawford to discuss, amongst other things such as Afghanistan, a wide range

of options about how to deal with Iraq, from containment and sanctions to

conceptual military action. There was no discussion on the detail of military action

or military options.”67

133. Adm Boyce told the Inquiry that his “presence at Chequers on that particular

occasion was simply if there were questions coming up about what could be done

militarily, what was our capability should we be asked to do something”; and that

“no particular preparations were made for that” meeting.68

134. Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that Sir Kevin Tebbit had attended the meeting on his

behalf, and that he “knew that there were quite detailed discussions about what was

going to happen at Crawford”.69

135. The MOD has been unable to locate any record of Sir Kevin’s report to, or

discussion with, Mr Hoon.70

136. Mr Blair wrote in his memoir that Admiral Boyce and:

“… [Lt Gen] Pigott who had studied the military options, gave a presentation. They

warned it could be a bloody fight and take a long time to remove Saddam. The US

65 Minute Cholerton to PS/PUS [MOD], 8 April 2002 [sic], ‘Iraq: Meeting with Prime Minister at Chequers’.

66 Public hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 10‑11.

67 Statement Boyce, 27 January 2011.

68 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, page 3.

69 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, page 18.

70 Letter MOD Iraq Inquiry Unit to Iraq Inquiry Secretariat, 23 May 2012, [untitled].

196