The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

unhelpful precedent, it would be better not to quote directly from specific or

identified JIC Assessments themselves.”

336. It was also suggested that it would be a good idea to keep the Intelligence and

Security Committee informed of what was proposed.

337. Mr Scarlett invited Mr Miller:

“… to lead on preparing a revised version of the dossier for further comment,

to be circulated later in the week. The new draft would in particular describe the

impact of recent intelligence and explain the evolution and significance of the JIC’s

assessments. The Committee’s agreement to the section of the draft dealing with

the intelligence assessment would be sought before the dossier was finalised.”

338. There is no record of any discussion of the substance of specific points in the

draft dossier.

339. Sir Richard Dearlove, Sir Francis Richards, Air Marshal Joe French (Chief of

Defence Intelligence), Sir David Omand, Sir David Manning, Mr Simon Webb (MOD

Policy Director), Mr Bowen, Ms Eliza Manningham-Buller (Deputy Director General

of the Security Service), and Mr Mike Grannatt (Cabinet Office Director General,

Government Information and Communication Service (GICS)), were among those

present at the meeting.

340. In its discussion of the future work programme, the JIC “agreed that there was

an increasing appetite for papers on aspects of the Iraqi question”.

341. Mr Scarlett told the Hutton Inquiry that his instructions from the JIC were

“to keep what we were writing in line with standing JIC Assessments and also with

recent intelligence”.159

342. Mr Scarlett also stated that the JIC had given its formal agreement to taking

on the dossier; and that it had responded with several important points. It wanted the

drafters to:

• “… convey the rising level of concern on which the JIC took its view about Iraq’s

programmes and development of weapons of mass destruction.”

• “… in particular … to highlight the progress which was being made since 1998,

despite sanctions.”

• “… make it clear the JIC assessment that Iraq was ready to use these

weapons.”

• “… take full account of the recent intelligence which had been coming in.”160

159 The Hutton Inquiry, public hearing, 23 September 2003, page 159.

160 The Hutton Inquiry, public hearing, 23 September 2003, page 85.

178