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10.2  |  Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
Responding to the new US Clear-Hold-Build strategy
373.  Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad succeeded Ambassador John Negroponte as the
US Ambassador to Iraq in June 2005.218
374.  To assess the situation and propose a way forward, Ambassador Khalilzad
established a Joint Civil-Military Strategic Planning Group, generally known as the Red
Cell or Red Team. The Red Team was tasked to devise a plan that would break the back
of the insurgency within one year and defeat it within three.
375.  Before Ambassador Khalilzad’s his arrival in Iraq, the DoD and the State
Department had initiated independent reviews of reconstruction strategy (led by General
Gary Luck and Ambassador Richard Jones respectively). Those reviews informed the
new approach developed by Ambassador Khalilzad.
376.  A key issue was the amount of US funding that remained available. After a slow
start, the US reconstruction effort was “in high gear”. Of the US$18.4bn appropriated for
IRRF2, three-quarters had been obligated and one-third disbursed.
377.  Ambassador Khalilzad met Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed
Forces, on 20 July.219 The Ambassador raised the subject of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), some of which had worked well in Afghanistan, and asked whether there
was a role for them in Iraq. Mr Ingram wondered whether PRTs would, in many parts of
Iraq, be too exposed. He also commented that “one of the problems of even considering
such fresh approaches … was the risk that they could be leaked”.
378.  Ambassador Khalilzad offered to share US thinking on PRTs with the UK,
including on whether projects should be driven by “operational security” or longer-term
development goals.
379.  Mr William Patey, Mr Chaplin’s successor as British Ambassador to Iraq, reported
on 27 July that the availability of electricity and fuel was barely different from a year
earlier.220 Progress was being made, but it would be “a long haul” and managing Iraqi
expectations would be key. He commented:
“Ordinary Iraqis are becoming increasingly frustrated that, over two years after
Saddam’s fall, there has been little discernible improvement to essential services …
“Ultimately, the Iraqis need to plan much longer term … There needs to be an
integrated energy strategy … The current focus – including from US advisers – is
short-term. DFID is funding two advisers to help the Ministry of Electricity (and
Ministry of Oil) develop a coherent longer-term strategy, including creating the legal
218  Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2009.
219  Minute Johnson to DJC DD Iraq, 22 July 2005, ‘Minister(AF) Meeting with Ambassador Khalizad’.
220  Telegram 9933/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 27 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Oil and Electricity: Are Things
Getting Better?’.
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