10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
373.
Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad succeeded Ambassador John Negroponte as
the
US
Ambassador to Iraq in June 2005.218
374.
To assess the
situation and propose a way forward, Ambassador
Khalilzad
established
a Joint Civil-Military Strategic Planning Group, generally known as
the Red
Cell or Red
Team. The Red Team was tasked to devise a plan that would break the
back
of the
insurgency within one year and defeat it within three.
375.
Before
Ambassador Khalilzad’s his arrival in Iraq, the DoD and the
State
Department
had initiated independent reviews of reconstruction strategy (led
by General
Gary Luck
and Ambassador Richard Jones respectively). Those reviews informed
the
new
approach developed by Ambassador Khalilzad.
376.
A key issue
was the amount of US funding that remained available. After a
slow
start, the
US reconstruction effort was “in high gear”. Of the US$18.4bn
appropriated for
IRRF2,
three-quarters had been obligated and one-third
disbursed.
377.
Ambassador
Khalilzad met Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the
Armed
Forces, on
20 July.219
The
Ambassador raised the subject of Provincial
Reconstruction
Teams
(PRTs), some of which had worked well in Afghanistan, and asked
whether there
was a role
for them in Iraq. Mr Ingram wondered whether PRTs would, in
many parts of
Iraq, be
too exposed. He also commented that “one of the problems of even
considering
such fresh
approaches … was the risk that they could be leaked”.
378.
Ambassador
Khalilzad offered to share US thinking on PRTs with the
UK,
including
on whether projects should be driven by “operational security” or
longer-term
development
goals.
379.
Mr William
Patey, Mr Chaplin’s successor as British Ambassador to Iraq,
reported
on 27 July
that the availability of electricity and fuel was barely different
from a year
earlier.220
Progress
was being made, but it would be “a long haul” and managing
Iraqi
expectations
would be key. He commented:
“Ordinary
Iraqis are becoming increasingly frustrated that, over two years
after
Saddam’s
fall, there has been little discernible improvement to essential
services …
“Ultimately,
the Iraqis need to plan much longer term … There needs to be
an
integrated
energy strategy … The current focus – including from US advisers –
is
short-term.
DFID is funding two advisers to help the Ministry of Electricity
(and
Ministry of
Oil) develop a coherent longer-term strategy, including creating
the legal
218
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.
U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2009.
219
Minute
Johnson to DJC DD Iraq, 22 July 2005, ‘Minister(AF) Meeting with
Ambassador Khalizad’.
220
Telegram
9933/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 27 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Oil and
Electricity: Are Things
Getting Better?’.
259