The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“The problem was … that … this was a highly autocratic state, where almost

everybody revolved around the person, the thinking the behaviour and whims of the

leader. So it was what was going on in his mind which was critical, and that was very

difficult to fathom. And by his [Saddam Hussein’s] nature such a society generates,

deliberately or not, obfuscation and uncertainty. Nobody quite knows what about

what. There is a great deal of uncertainty of knowledge.

“So an individual, maybe a very senior military or civilian commander who you would

normally expect to have quite a confident view of a particular issue or capability …

might not … might say … I don’t know about this, but … a friend who does … tells

me … and you wouldn’t really know whether that was true or not.”268

655. Sir John subsequently told the Inquiry:

“… taken overall, I think as of mid-March 2003 … I think we said five lines [of

HUMINT] by that stage … [T]hat was a general statement which we were given by

the agency [SIS]. It wasn’t something that reflected research and real knowledge on

our part.”269

656. SIS1 told the Inquiry:

“I think there was a sense in Iraq where the leader wished to convey to a fearful

regime and the people that he was powerful, that he had things up his sleeve, and

that those who were responsible for various programmes wanted to convince the

leader that work was continuing and that there were capabilities. It was not a well

organised place. It was extremely repressive.

…

“And it was corrupt. So people told people up and down what they wanted to hear,

and things which suited their ends.”270

657. The Inquiry asked SIS1 whether SIS sources and Iraqis in direct contact, for

example, with the UN and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who were saying, “we don’t have

anything”, were telling the truth as they knew it then, or whether he thought some of

them did suspect they had something but that was the party line. SIS1 replied:

“Many of them believed they had it, and in a way that was part of the picture that we

were getting […].271

658. Asked whether he thought there were any lessons, SIS1 observed, “we based a lot

on not enough”.272

268 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 32-33.

269 Private hearing, 5 June 2010, page 31.

270 Private hearing, 2010, pages 57-58.

271 Private hearing, 2010, page 58.

272 Private hearing, 2010, page 82.

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