9.3  |  July 2004 to May 2005

Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, and had been written by the Assessments Staff drawing on

the conclusions of a cross-Whitehall discussion led by the JIC Chair.

171.  The Assessment stated that:

“Iraqi Sunni Arabs believe they have little to gain from the political process.

A minority (but numbered in many thousands) are involved in armed insurgency.

The majority of Sunni Arabs are likely to sympathise with the insurgents.”

172.  The Assessments Staff judged that Sunni Arab Iraqis had the same basic interests

as all other Iraqi citizens: security, the provision of services and employment. In addition,

however, they had some specific concerns, in particular loss of status and a real fear

of Shia domination and Iranian influence.

173.  The paper stated that all the insurgents were united in their resentment of the

presence of foreign forces, and that “their hatred of the US in particular has been

developing since 1990”. Despite these similarities, the underlying motivating factors

were likely to vary between groups:

“Nationalists want to see significant Sunni Arab representation in Iraq’s political

structures. They want a strong Iraq that can resist Iranian threats and Western

oppression. They want to see rulers who represent all Iraq and are not exiles.

They might engage in a political process if they could see it delivering – but they

do not at present have any organised political representation.

“Ba’athists are most resistant to the current political process. They do not all want

Saddam’s return (although some do), but want to regain their position of power.

They want an Iraq dominated by Sunni Arabs loyal to their leadership and able

to check Kurdish and Shia aspirations.

“Islamists view fighting the Occupation as jihad and have a vision of Iraq as a

Sunni Islamic state – they recall Baghdad as the central power during Islam’s

‘Golden Age’ (749-1258). There are a number of organised Sunni Islamist parties.

Neither these nor most Sunni Islamists are engaging with the political process –

but some may be persuaded to do so.

“Disaffected Iraqis and opportunists are motivated more by personal

circumstances than by a strategy for Iraq. They are most likely to be swayed by

visible improvements to their daily lives and political and economic progress.

But their association with more committed insurgents may over time result in

them adopting their agenda.”

174.  The Assessments Staff judged that:

“… insurgent groups rather than the political process appear to many Sunni Arabs

to be more likely to deliver what they want … If the election has virtually no

Sunni Arab participation and results in little Sunni Arab representation, the

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