The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
138.
In preparation
for his meeting with Dr Blix on 22 November, the FCO
advised
Mr Blair
that it would be helpful if he could give Dr Blix a number of
key messages,
including
that the UK:
•
had “worked
very hard” for resolution 1441 and it was determined to
do
everything
it could to make it work and UNMOVIC was vital to
that;
•
would do
“whatever we can” to meet Dr Blix’s “practical needs”,
including
intelligence
support;
•
did
“not
want to
compromise UNMOVIC’s credibility as an independent
organisation”,
but there was a need for UNMOVIC to “bolster its credibility
with
some in the
US”; UNMOVIC should make full use of the powers resolution
1441
139.
The FCO stated
that there was “a continued whispering campaign
against”
Dr Blix
in the US press. The UK was “keen to see a programme of multiple
inspections
designed to
stretch Iraqi countermeasures and put Saddam’s willingness to
co‑operate
under early
test”. But the UK recognised “that UNMOVIC will need time to
re‑establish
itself … It
will not help our objectives if we push the inspectors into making
mistakes
by forcing
them to run before they can walk.”
140.
The FCO
advised that the US was “putting great weight” on the powers
in
resolution
1441 for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to interview individuals free of
Iraqi
Government
“minders”, if necessary outside Iraq. The UK agreed that interviews
would
be a “very
important route to obtaining the sort of information we will need
if covert Iraqi
programmes
are to be uncovered”. But the UK also understood Dr Blix’s
“concerns
about the
practical and legal implication of extracting Iraqis – perhaps with
a large
number of
family members – from Iraq and then holding them perhaps
indefinitely”.
The US
had admitted that it had not “thought through all these points”
although it was
now doing
so.
141.
In their
meeting on 22 November, Mr Blair told Dr Blix that there
had been much
support at
the Prague Summit for him and the inspectors, and for a tough line
on the
need for
full Iraqi compliance with resolution 1441.46
142.
Dr Blix
reported that he had told the Iraqi Foreign Minister and others in
Baghdad
that Iraq
should not make the mistakes it had made after the Gulf Conflict of
providing
an
incomplete account of their holdings; and that they should not
repeat the mistake
of playing
with the UN and offering too little too late. He had not, however,
detected
any sign
that the Iraqi approach had changed. Nor was there any sign of
legislation
to prohibit
involvement by Iraqi citizens in WMD programmes; that could be
passed
overnight
and would have got Iraqi co‑operation off to a flying start.
Preparations for
45
Letter
Davies to Wechsberg, 21 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting with Dr Hans Blix,
22 November’.
46
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 22 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting with Blix, 22 November’.
28