The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
118.
At a meeting
of the Chiefs of Staff on 2 August, Lieutenant General
Nicholas
Houghton,
Chief of Joint Operations, asked Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock
Stirrup, Chief of
the Defence
Staff, for direction on two particular issues:
•
the extent
to which US capabilities could be used in MND(SE) in order
to
provide
surge capacity for Operation SALAMANCA (the name of the
operation
to implement
the military elements of the Basra Security Plan); and
•
the
possibility of deployment of UK forces outside MND(SE),
specifically a
deployment
to Multi‑National Division (Centre‑South) to support the US
who
were
“taking risk in CS to deliver the Baghdad Security
Plan”.82
119.
ACM Stirrup
directed that it was acceptable for the UK to make use of
US
enablers,
such as aviation in MND(SE) but that, in general, commitments in
MND(SE)
were to be
met by existing MND(SE) personnel (including contractors) and any
shortfalls
were to be
identified and considered appropriately.
120.
ACM Stirrup
also directed that the deployment of UK troops to
MND(CS):
“… crossed
a clear policy ‘red line’ and seemed counter‑intuitive, given
that
consideration
was also being given to obtaining US forces for MND(SE). The
UK
needed to
draw down its force levels as soon as practicable, both in MND(SE)
and
elsewhere.”
121.
On 4 August, a
Current Intelligence Group (CIG) considered the potential
threat
to UK
forces in Iraq in the context of the Israel/Lebanon crisis, and
judged that:
“… Shia
frustration with Multinational Forces (MNF) has increased
significantly since
the first
part of the year. This is likely to be manifested in violent
demonstrations
against
MNF. Against this background, any anti‑MNF attacks prompted by
perceived
US or UK
support for Israel’s actions in Lebanon will be difficult to
distinguish from
the wider
existing threat …”83
The 2006
Lebanon War began with the deaths of eight Israeli soldiers, and
the abduction
of a
further two, in a cross‑border Hizballah ambush.84
This led to
Israeli attacks, using air
strikes and
artillery, against a range of targets in Lebanon.
In
response, Hizballah fired rockets into northern Israel. There was
also heavy fighting in
southern
Lebanon following an Israeli invasion.
82
Minutes, 2
August 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
83
CIG
Assessment, 4 August 2006, ‘Israel/Lebanon Crisis: Threat to UK
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan’.
84
BBC
News, 6 May
2008, 2006:
Lebanon War.
24