The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Washington
after the Rock Drill on 21 and 22 February 2003: “The
inter‑agency
rehearsal
for Phase IV … exposes the enormous scale of the task …
Overall,
planning is
at a very rudimentary stage”223);
•
the need to
agree with the US the nature of the UK contribution to those
plans
(including
in the letter from Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Sir David
Manning on
28 February
2003: it was “absolutely clear” that the US expected the UK to
take
leadership
of the South‑East sector. The UK was “currently at risk of taking
on
a very
substantial commitment that we will have great difficulty in
sustaining
beyond the
immediate conclusion of conflict”224);
and
•
the
importance (including in the ‘UK overall plan for Phase IV’, shown
to Mr Blair
{{UN
authorisation for the military occupation of Iraq, without which
there
would be no
legal cover for certain post‑conflict tasks;
{{a UN
framework for the administration and reconstruction of Iraq during
the
transition
to Iraqi self‑government.
627.
Mr Blair
told the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 2003 that “the ‘Issue’ was
aftermath
– the
Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting breaking
out”.226
628.
In his
evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 21 January
2003,
Mr Blair
emphasised the importance of the post‑conflict phase:
“You do not
engage in military conflict that may produce regime change unless
you
are
prepared to follow through and work in the aftermath of that regime
change to
ensure the
country is stable and the people are properly looked
after.”227
629.
On 24 January
2003, Mr Blair told President Bush that the biggest risk they
faced
was
internecine fighting, and that delay would allow time for working
up more coherent
630.
Yet when
Mr Blair set out the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the
House of
Commons on
18 March 2003, no assessment had been made of whether
that vision
was achievable,
no agreement had been reached with the US on a
workable post‑conflict
plan, UN
authorisation had not yet been secured, and there had been no
decision on
the UN’s
role in post‑conflict Iraq.
223
Telegram
235 Washington to FCO London, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After:
Rehearsal of Office of
Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance’.
224
Letter
Williams to Manning, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning and
Preparation’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning Update – 28 February
2003’.
225
Paper Iraq
Planning Unit, 7 March 2003, ‘The UK overall plan for Phase
IV’.
226
Minute
MA/DCJO to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime
Minister’.
227
Liaison
Committee, Session 2002‑2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the
Liaison Committee
Tuesday 21
January 2003, Q 117.
228
Letter
Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled] attaching
‘Note’.
84