The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
383.
Mr Blair
expressed his views in frequent telephone calls and in meetings
with the
President.
There was also a very active channel between his Foreign Affairs
Adviser and
the
President’s National Security Advisor. Mr Blair also sent
detailed written Notes to the
President.
384.
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, told the
Inquiry:
“... the
Prime Minister had a habit of writing notes, both internally and to
President
Clinton and
to President Bush, on all sorts of subjects, because he found it
better
to put
something in writing rather than to simply talk about it orally and
get it much
more
concretely ... in focused terms.”176
385.
Mr Blair
drew on information and briefing received from Whitehall
departments,
but evidently
drafted many or most of his Notes to the President himself,
showing
the drafts
to his close advisers in No.10 but not (ahead of despatch) to the
relevant
Cabinet
Ministers.
386.
How best to
exercise influence with the President of the United States is a
matter
for the
tactical judgement of the Prime Minister, and will vary between
Prime Ministers
and
Presidents. In relation to Iraq, Mr Blair’s judgement, as he
and others have
explained,
was that objectives the UK identified for a successful strategy
should not
be expressed
as conditions for its support.
387.
Mr Powell
told the Inquiry that Mr Blair was offering the US a
“partnership to try
to get
to a wide coalition” and “setting out a framework” and to try to
persuade the US
to move
in a particular direction.177
388.
Mr Blair
undoubtedly influenced the President’s decision to go to the UN
Security
Council in
the autumn of 2002. On other critical decisions set out in the
Report, he did
not succeed
in changing the approach determined in Washington.
389.
This issue is
addressed in the Lessons section of this Executive Summary,
under
the heading
“The decision to go to war”.
390.
The way in
which the policy on Iraq was developed and decisions were taken
and
implemented
within the UK Government has been at the heart of the Inquiry’s
work and
fundamental
to its conclusions.
391.
The Inquiry
has set out in Section 2 of the Report the roles and
responsibilities
of key
individuals and bodies in order to assist the reader. It is also
publishing with the
Report many
of the documents which illuminate who took the key decisions and on
what
176
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, page 38.
177
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 77‑78.
54