4.4 | The
search for WMD
234.
In its advice
on UK plans for third-party verification, the FCO stated that the
media
would
“provide some independent witnesses for finds in Iraq” but,
“without independent
validation”,
the Coalition might “well be accused of planting
evidence”.135
UN
validation,
ideally by
UNMOVIC inspectors, would carry the most weight where it really
mattered
to the UK,
in the Security Council and with UK media. Ideally, the UK would
like to give
UNMOVIC
inspectors access to any relevant finds. At the least, the
Coalition should
undertake
to provide a full report of its investigation to the UN, including
any test results.
235.
The FCO added
that the US remained “neuralgic” on UNMOVIC. Officials
were
seeking to engage with the US to revitalise and reform UNMOVIC
when
Dr Blix’s
contract expired on 25 June. US officials had not yet replied
to a UK paper on
restructuring
UNMOVIC passed to them on 20 May. The US had, however, agreed
that
IAEA
experts could check the security of a store of radioactive
material.
236.
The FCO was
examining other options for independent validation, including
using
a
laboratory in the Netherlands to test CBW samples, but the Dutch
wanted UN cover
for doing
so.
237.
Mr Rycroft
commented to Mr Blair that UNMOVIC would be the most
credible
option for
verification, but the US would “not permit that, at least not
without a new
leadership/mandate/organisation”.136
238.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that comments from US
media
and
prominent Senators were largely sympathetic to the US
Government.137
Most
had argued
that it was too early to draw conclusions, but some were calling
for an
independent
inquiry into US intelligence on Iraqi WMD.
239.
The Embassy
also reported that the Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services
and
Intelligence
Committees had agreed to conduct a joint inquiry into the
pre-conflict use
of
intelligence by the US Administration. In addition, the White House
was “crafting a
line” on
whether there should be an independent inquiry. The Embassy had
“strongly
encouraged”
that it should be discussed in advance with the UK.
240.
Mr Rycroft
reported to Mr Blair that the two US Committees were “part of
the
normal
Congressional oversight of the Administration”.138
The first
hearing would be
later in
June.
241.
Mr Rycroft
also told Mr Blair that:
“…
according to the press, the CIA will provide shortly to Congress
the
‘underlying
intelligence which was the basis’ for [Secretary] Powell’s
UN
135
Letter
McDonald to Rycroft, 2 June 2003, ‘Iraq WMD: Third Party
Validation’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
[undated], ‘UNMOVIC: Restructuring’.
136
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq:
WMD’.
137
Telegram
772 Washington to FCO London, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: US
Views’.
138
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq:
WMD’.
471