The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
436.
From early
April, policing functions in MND(SE) were undertaken by
the
military,
under a Royal Military Police (RMP) lead.379
Following
his visit to Iraq in May,
CC Kernaghan
observed that “local volunteers had been recruited as auxiliaries
and that
they,
together with elements of the Saddam Hussein era police, were being
trained by
the RMP in
the basics of police work”. Plans were in place to refurbish police
stations,
courts and
prisons; to provide basic training to officers who had reported
back or had
been
recruited since the invasion; to select and issue new uniforms; and
to re‑establish
a viable
local criminal justice system.
437.
CC Kernaghan
judged that “the British effort was focused on providing a
visible
police
presence on the streets to reassure the wider
population”.
438.
By early July,
the military had appointed a Chief of Police and outlined plans
to
develop a
training academy in az‑Zubayr, near Basra.380
439.
The Dutch
Marechaussee (Royal Military Constabulary) and Italian
Carabinieri
(National
Military Police) were also deployed in Muthanna and Dhi Qar
provinces
respectively.
They undertook basic training and mentoring of Iraqi police in
their areas.
Maj Gen Stewart
told the Inquiry that the Carabinieri were “just the right sort of
troops
to help
train [the Iraqis]”.381
440.
A record of a
meeting on 25 June between the FCO, ACPO and the Home
Office
stated:
“The Prime
Minister was authoritatively quoted as wishing to see the southern
AO …
develop as
an exemplar for the whole of Iraq. The Iraq Policy Unit (IPU) made
it
clear that
HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] recognised the need to make
progress
in advance
of any agreed CPA strategy [on SSR]. Specifically, in respect of
the Iraqi
Armed
Forces and the police.”382
By June,
British commanders had instigated the creation of the “Basra River
Service” to
employ
ex‑naval personnel. Major General Adrian Bradshaw, Commander 7
Armoured
Brigade in
2003, told the Inquiry:
“In the
weeks after our arrival, we became very aware that the ex‑naval and
military
personnel
in the province, of whom there were 10,000 or 12,000, had also not
been
paid for
several months and were facing a desperate situation and … they
came to us
asking for
us to do something about their people …
379
Letter
Kernaghan to Blunkett, 23 May 2003, ‘Iraq – Visit by Chief
Constable P R Kernaghan’ attaching
Report
Kernaghan, 10 May 2003, ‘Report on Visit to Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan [13-20 May 2003]’.
380
Statement
White, 20 June 2010, pages 19‑20.
381
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 75.
382
Minute
Kernaghan to UND [junior official], 26 June 2003, ‘Iraq and the UK
Police Service – meeting
25/6/03’.
154