The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
638.
On
31 January, Mr Rycroft informed Mr Blair that,
during a visit to Washington
from 30 to
31 January, he had explained that recent comments from
Mr Kay, Dr Rice
and
Secretary Powell had been damaging in the UK.351
He had also
argued against an
intelligence
inquiry, and for maximum transparency and co-ordination if the US
decided
to go down
that route. There was a strong chance that the US would do so,
possibly
very fast.
639.
Mr Rycroft
advised Mr Blair: “You need to raise with Bush at Monday’s
[2 February]
video
conference.”
640.
On
31 January, Sir David Manning reported growing political
pressure on President
Bush to
admit intelligence failure and announce an inquiry.352
Asked for
his views on
whether
there should be an inquiry, President Bush had told the
press:
“… I too,
want to know the facts. I want to be able to compare what the Iraq
Survey
Group has
found with what we thought prior to going into Iraq. One thing is
for
certain –
one thing we do know from Mr Kay’s testimony, as well as from
the
years of
intelligence that we had gathered, is that Saddam Hussein was a
…
growing
danger.”
641.
Sir David
Manning advised that President Bush’s remarks suggested he
was
leaving
himself room to set up an inquiry.
642.
Mr Blair
set out his position on Iraq and WMD in a Note sent to
President
Bush on
1 February.
643.
Mr Blair
recognised the need to learn lessons about the difficulties
of
gathering
intelligence and that there was a legitimate issue about its
accuracy, but
at that
stage envisaged asking the ISC to address the issue.
644.
On
1 February, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a Note “by the
Prime Minister” on
Iraq and
WMD, to be shown to President Bush before the video conference with
Mr Blair
645.
The Note
addressed two issues:
•
“Iraq and
WMD”; and
•
“WMD as a
threat more generally”.
351
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 January 2004, ‘Visit to
Washington’.
352
Telegram 1
Washington to Cabinet Office, 31 January 2004, ‘Intelligence
on Iraq WMD: US views,
30 January’.
353
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 1 February 2004, ‘Iraq and WMD’ attaching
Note [Blair to Bush], ‘Note on
WMD’.
550