The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
is a
serious Iraqi outrage, the harder the language, the more difficult
it will be to get the
resolution
through”.
156.
The FCO had
produced a “more developed reworking” of the draft
elements
for a
resolution setting out an ultimatum it had offered on 26 July. The
key options
identified
were:
•
A choice
between describing Iraq’s refusal to accept the return of
weapons
inspectors
as a “material breach” of resolution 687 (1991) (the
cease‑fire
resolution)
or a “flagrant violation”. The former would be clearer and send a
very
direct
message, but “might be difficult for some Council members to
accept”.
The latter
might be “a little easier to sell” and was an “obvious
fact”.
•
Whether to
include an explicit operative paragraph setting a date for Iraq to
allow
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access
…
so that
they may discharge their mandates”, after which it would be deemed
that
Iraq had no
intention of complying with its obligations. Such a paragraph
was
seen to
have “political and presentational” advantages although it might
“not be
indispensable”
if a date were to be included in an earlier operative
paragraph
which
demanded that Iraq immediately reverse its non‑co‑operation
with
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA.
157.
The FCO
advised that, subject to Lord Goldsmith’s views, a resolution
“(particularly
with
‘material breach’ language) would still give cover for military
action, and that in legal
terms no
further Council decisions would be required”.
158.
The FCO warned
that, in the absence of clear language on a demand that
Iraq
reverse its
non‑co‑operation within a specified time, the opponents of military
action
would argue
that Iraq “should be given still more time to comply”. It would be
“important”
that the
draft resolution provided “legal cover for military action without
further Council
action”.
The Attorney General’s advice would be needed on that
point.
159.
Mr Straw
considered that the UK should try to persuade President Bush to
state
that the
aim of regime change was to ensure the disarmament of Iraq. The
most
appropriate
occasion might be the President’s speech to the UN General Assembly
in
September,
as part of a wider challenge to the UN to demonstrate that it could
tackle
the problem
of WMD in the hands of rogue states. That could open the way for
a
discussion
in the Security Council on an “ultimatum resolution”. Mr Straw
also suggested
that
discussion might provide “a peg for publishing via the UN the
long‑awaited
‘Iraq Dossier’”.
160.
The FCO advice
was sent to the Private Offices of Mr Hoon and Lord
Goldsmith,
and to
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN
in New York.
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