Executive
Summary
obligations
imposed by the UN; and that it was important to agree to the return
of UN
inspectors
to Iraq.
508.
The focus on
Iraq was not the result of a step change in Iraq’s
capabilities
or intentions.
509.
When he saw
the draft paper on WMD countries of concern on 8 March,
Mr Straw
commented:
“Good, but
should not Iraq be first and also have more text? The paper has to
show
why there
is an exceptional threat from Iraq. It does not quite do this
yet.”200
510.
On 18 March,
Mr Straw decided that a paper on Iraq should be issued before
one
addressing
other countries of concern.
511.
On 22 March,
Mr Straw was advised that the evidence would not convince
public
opinion
that there was an imminent threat from Iraq. Publication was
postponed.
512.
No.10 decided
that the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat
should
co‑ordinate
the production of a “public dossier” on Iraq, and that
Mr Campbell should
“retain the
lead role on the timing/form of its release”.
513.
The statements
prepared for, and used by, the UK Government in public,
from
late 2001
onwards, about Iraq’s proscribed activities and the potential
threat they posed
were
understandably written in more direct and less nuanced language
than the JIC
Assessments
on which they drew.
514.
The question
is whether, in doing so, they conveyed more certainty and
knowledge
than was
justified, or created tests it would be impossible for Iraq to
meet. That is of
particular
concern in relation to the evidence in Section 4.1 on two key
issues.
515.
First, the
estimates of the weapons and material related to Iraq’s chemical
and
biological
warfare programmes for which UNSCOM had been unable to account
were
based on
extrapolations from UNSCOM records. Officials explicitly advised
that it was
“inherently
difficult to arrive at precise figures”. In addition, it was
acknowledged that
neither
UNSCOM nor the UK could be certain about either exactly what had
existed
or what
Iraq had already destroyed.
516.
The revised
estimates announced by Mr Straw on 2 May were
increasingly
presented
in Government statements as the benchmark against which Iraq
should
be judged.
517.
Second, the
expert MOD examination of issues in late March 2002 exposed
the
difficulties
Iraq would have to overcome before it could acquire a nuclear
weapon.
That included
the difficulty of acquiring suitable fissile material from the
“black market”.
200
Minute
McDonald to Ricketts, 11 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
71