3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
•
The impact
of events in the Middle East on attitudes among the ethnic
minorities
in the UK,
and the encouragement that could give to political extremists,
should
not be
under-estimated.
662.
Mr Blair
concluded that it was important to maintain the maximum possible
level
of
international support for policy towards the Middle East, including
Iraq. Given the
impossibility
of foreseeing precisely how events would unfold, it was important
for the
Government
not to “tie its hands”. If Saddam Hussein were to reject a clear
ultimatum on
the return
of weapons inspectors, there would be widespread understanding of
the need
to take
appropriate action.
663.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair wrote that there had been “a
full Cabinet
discussion”
after the visit on 11 April “where we set out our
objectives”.243
664.
Asked whether
the Cabinet was discussing regime change and how it might
have
been
effected, Mr Blair told the Inquiry:
“… from 11
April … the Cabinet was discussing this. We are going to have to
deal
with this
issue now. Everybody knew that the Americans were taking a
different and
stronger
line. The issue was very simple. He [Saddam Hussein] either had a
change
of heart,
or regime change was on the agenda. That was clear from the
minutes,
from the
discussion at Cabinet and indeed from the whole of the public
discourse
around
this.
“Now you
could have regime change happening in a number of different ways.
There
didn’t need
to be military action but the likelihood was that’s what would
happen.”244
665.
Lord Wilson
confirmed that the flavour of the discussion was of turmoil in
the
Middle East
and the Arab world, although “we were left in no doubt by Crawford
… that
the
Americans wanted regime change”, which “in a sense” was “not news”.
In addition
to Mr
Blair, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, four Cabinet Ministers had spoken on
Iraq.245
666.
Lord Wilson
described Mr Blair’s report to Cabinet on 11 April as:
“…
skilfully touching on the things Cabinet had been concerned about
and
reassuring
them that nothing was imminent and he was using his influence to
bring
the
American President in the direction he wanted to go. Indeed, I
think he may have
been
congratulated by one Cabinet Minister on shifting American thinking
in … the
direction
of the United [Nations].” 246
667.
Lord Wilson
added that he did not think “anyone would have gone away
thinking
they had
authorised a course of action likely to lead to military
action”.
243
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 4.
244
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 13-14.
245
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 74-76.
246
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 75-76.
509