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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
344.  In his memoir, Mr Cook wrote that he had offered three suggestions for how
“we should conduct ourselves if we are going to reconnect with the public”:
“We could stop appearing to force the pace on the war. The public will only follow
us if they believe we are reluctant about conflict …
“We need to find a distinctive British tone in which we address the Iraq crisis.
We should stop appearing as the US and UK axis.
“We should stick to the UN like glue. If tomorrow Hans Blix asks for more time
for inspectors, he must get it. If we depart from the UN process we shall be
committing suicide …”95
345.  Mr Campbell wrote that there was also a meeting with Mr Straw on tactics for the
second resolution and whether it should be tabled before the European Council.96
346.  Sir David Manning and Dr Rice discussed the next steps and tactics and timings
on 13 February, including concerns about a possible Franco-German initiative.97
347.  Sir David told Dr Rice that the UK preference was to wait to table a second
resolution until after the special EU Council on Iraq, unless circumstances dictated
an earlier date.
348.  In the meeting of the Security Council the following day, the UK aim was to move
the discussion away from process and focus it on substance: “The best bet seemed to
be to put a series of very tough questions to Blix about Iraqi performance and insist on
very clear answers.” The UK did not want “Saturday’s headlines being about calls in the
Security Council to give the inspectors more time”.
349.  In his record of the discussion, Sir David commented: “We should also have a draft
resolution in our back pockets, ready to put down at a moment’s notice.”
350.  Mr Tony Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy Washington,
wrote to Sir David Manning on 13 February stating:
“Sitting in on Mr Hoon’s meetings with Condi Rice and Don Rumsfeld [Mr Donald
Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense] yesterday I was very struck by how the military
timetable is now driving the diplomatic end game.”98
95  Cook R. The Point of Departure. Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
96  Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown
to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.
97  Letter Manning to McDonald, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
98  Letter Brenton to Manning, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: The Timetable’.
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