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14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)
THE INCREASING THREAT OF INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS
1104.  The deterioration of security in Iraq from August 2003 is referred to earlier in
this Section and in Section 9.2. In addition to the introduction of IEDs, there were also
indirect fire (IDF) attacks on Coalition Forces, using mortars, man‑portable surface‑to‑air
missiles and small arms fire.
1105.  The solution was considered to be a combination of hardening structures and
improving surveillance.
1106.  Concerns about the safety of civilian personnel as the IDF risk increased are
detailed in Section 15.1.
1107.  In his post‑tour report, Major General Andrew Stewart, GOC MND(SE) from
December 2003 to July 2004, stated:
“We have been extremely fortunate that we have not suffered casualties in bases
from indirect fire. Attacks against them are sure to increase. Hardening, in some
form or other, has to take place.”585
1108.  The MOD provided accommodation to personnel in theatre according to one of
three types, depending on the capability required:
Tier 1 tented structures;
Tier 2 cabin structures; and
Tier 3 hard structures made from concrete, steel and masonry.586
1109.  On 14 March 2005, Air Marshal Glenn Torpy, CJO, advised General Sir Michael
Walker, CDS, that CITADEL, a hardened form of accommodation, should not be
introduced to Iraq and that the risk of IDF should be managed through a combination of
continued enhancement of accommodation compartmentalisation and force protection
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).587
1110.  AM Torpy explained that, since June 2003, UK camps in Iraq had suffered attacks
from mortars and rocket IDF. The attacks tended to occur without warning and between
“1200 and 0300 hrs local”. They had led to 43 UK casualties but no fatalities.
1111.  AM Torpy continued that, following an increase in threat to UK camps, force
protection trials had been initiated to analyse the effectiveness of compartmentalisation
and to test the design for CITADEL.
585  Report Stewart, 13 July 2004, ‘Post Operation Report Operation TELIC 3/4 – 28 December 2003 –
13 July 2004’.
586  National Audit Office, Support to High Intensity Operations, 14 May 2009, HC 508.
587  Minute CJO to PSO/CDS, 14 March 2005, ‘Force Protection of UK Camps in Iraq’.
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