The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
22.
In April 2008,
the Equipment Capability branch (EC) in MND(SE) (the formation
of
which is
described below) produced an Urgent Statement of User Requirement
(USUR)
for an
“Urban PPV”. The Ridgback (which was also a variant of Cougar) was
ordered
to meet
the requirement but did not enter service in time for use in
Iraq.
23.
Neither
vehicle was a replacement for the Snatch Land Rover and
Ministers
continued
to receive advice that Snatch remained “mission
critical”8
in Iraq
and
Afghanistan
because of its profile, manoeuvrability and carrying capacity. Lt
Gen
Houghton
considered that removing it from theatre would have a significant
impact
on operations
by reducing patrols’ situational awareness and restricting
movement.
24.
MOD officials
explained to Mr Browne on 21 July 2006 that work was ongoing
within
the
department to source a medium weight PPV and that the armoured
vehicle review
had
accelerated the work by securing additional funding.
25.
The Inquiry
has considered why it took so long to fill a capability gap that
was
apparent
from the end of 2003.
26.
Within the MOD
and the Armed Forces the responsibility for meeting an
equipment
capability
gap during Op TELIC was clear: USURs for new equipment were
forwarded
to the
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), which retained ownership of
the USUR
until it
was signed off.
27.
What was
unclear was where responsibility lay for identifying and
articulating
capability
gaps. Because a USUR could be raised by “any user”,9
there was
no single
individual
or team accountable if an essential USUR was not raised. That was a
failure
of the
system. In a statement to the Inquiry, the MOD said that there was
“no simple
answer to
the question where the primary responsibility for identifying
capability gaps
and raising
USURs lay” during the post‑invasion phase.
28.
The evidence
suggests that this was not a problem in every instance. When a
gap
was clearly
identified and there was an appetite to address it, action was
taken. That
was
demonstrated by the deployment of electronic countermeasures and
enhancements
for the
protection of Warrior and FV430 vehicles.
29.
An analysis of
the land operation in Iraq published in August 2010 (known
as
“the Barry
Report”) stated that a requirement was more likely to be
identified, and the
subsequent
Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) to succeed, where there
was
“a strong
coherent sponsor in the Army or MOD”.10
8
Note CJO to
PSO/CDS, 7 November 2008, ‘Limiting the Deployment of Snatch
Outside Secure Bases’.
9
Letter
Duke‑Evans to Aldred, 26 June 2015, ‘Procuring Military
Equipment’.
10
Report Land
Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From a
Land Perspective’.
232