The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

It was still an irritant, but the number of casualties sustained by indirect fire reduced

dramatically from August onwards.”

1213. In September, the DOC undertook an “extensive review and analysis” of the

UK’s force protection capability in order to “expose risk, provide assurance and present

strategic recommendations” to the Chiefs of Staff.639

1214. The review is addressed earlier in this Section with regards to protected mobility

but specific points were also made about countering the IDF threat.

1215. The DOC wrote that units should have access to force protection equipment

prior to pre‑deployment training if possible to ensure that all personnel were adequately

trained in force protection procedures and equipment (particularly UOR equipment)

before arriving in theatre. The “recent Treasury decision to permit UOR procured

equipment to include an allocation for training” was already having an effect but it was

noteworthy that “several Commands were not aware of this significant development”.

1216. On accommodation, the DOC stated that the current Tier system was “based

on permanence (rather than the provision of FP)” and the nature of contemporary

operations suggested that that approach might be “sub‑optimal” for force protection:

“Recent experience has indicated that the decision to move from tents to more

resilient steel/concrete structures tends to be delayed by the understandable desire

to limit the deployed footprint, but this should be balanced against the nature of the

threat and type of operation (as well as other criteria such as FPE [Force Protection

Engineering] effort, cost and the logistic burden).”

1217. Considering the IDF threat, the DOC wrote that “the most effective way of

reducing the potential scale of a successful IDF attack is through a mix of good

ISTAR, physical compartmentalisation and infrastructure protection together with

active measures such as dominating the likely firing area through regular patrols and

C‑RAM‑type systems”.

1218. The DOC recommended: “ISTAR capability should continue to be developed

to provide a consistent 24/7 stream of fused intelligence to force protection decision

makers.”

1219. The DOC noted that investigations into the US Sense and Warn system were

under way. The Phalanx system had been deployed into theatre in May 2007 and, after

“initial teething problems”, its performance was improving. The likelihood of IDF being

a significant threat to deployed forces in current and future operations suggested that

a C‑RAM capability needed to be taken into the core Equipment Programme as an

enduring requirement. C‑RAM measures should be included in the design phase of

building a deployed base.

639 Report DOC, September 2007, ‘Directorate of Operational Capability Protection of the Deployed Force

Operational Audit Report 1/07’.

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