3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
465.
Sir David
replied that the last “would be ideal” and reported: “To my
surprise, Condi
warmly
agreed.”
466.
Sir David
commented that he had been left in little doubt that
Washington’s
patience
was “wearing very thin”. He added that he had been struck by
Dr Rice’s:
“… comment
on the possible collapse of Saddam’s regime. Perhaps, even in
the
White House
there is now a faint sense of disquiet about what a military
campaign
against
Iraq, and its subsequent occupation, would involve. Long shot
though it may
be, the
thought that the Iraqis might do the job themselves may seem
increasingly
attractive.”
467.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair that a resolution was needed that
week and
the UK
should:
•
insist on
material breach language in OP1;
•
get the
tightest inspection regime it could negotiate in OP5, taking
account
of Dr Blix’s
legitimate concerns;
•
look for
language in OP10 that balanced commitment to consult
with
commitment
to act; and
•
consider
pre‑negotiating a second resolution which committed everyone
to
action
“when Saddam is in breach” as a way through the “current
impasse”.163
468.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush on 14 October.
469.
The
conversation on Iraq focused primarily on the progress of the
discussions
on the
draft UN resolution, including the need to find common ground with
France
and to take
action if the UN did not respond.164
470.
Referring to
the “Kosovo model”, Mr Blair said that it would allow a return
to the
Security
Council for a further discussion in the event of a breach but it
was clear that
“if there
were no UN action then we would take action
ourselves”.
471.
Mr Blair
also underlined the importance of OP5; the key was for Saddam
Hussein
not only to
allow inspectors in but also to co‑operate fully with them and tell
the truth
about
Iraq’s WMD holdings.
472.
Commenting on
President Bush’s public line that war was his last choice,
Mr Blair
said that
had registered in Europe. They also discussed the possibility that
the issue
could be
resolved peacefully. A tough inspections regime could embolden
dissidents
“a la
Romania”. Mr Blair agreed that war was not inevitable but
disarmament was; either
through UN
inspections or through enforcement.
163
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 14 October 2002, ‘Bush
Call’.
164
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 14 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with Bush’.
285