4.3 | Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

683. Intelligence of 17 March 2003, that Saddam Hussein had not asked about

chemical weapons or ordered their reassembly, was viewed in the context of a policy

of concealment and the absence of chemical warheads for missiles rather than as an

absence of the capability.

684. Similarly, Iraq’s actions were consistently interpreted as indicative of deceit.

685. The ability to interview scientists and engineers involved in past programmes or

involved in Iraq’s unilateral destruction of weapons and materials was increasingly seen

as the key to identifying Iraq’s deception and the litmus test for Iraqi co-operation.

686. As Mr Straw told the FAC on 4 March 2003, interviews would “expose the regime’s

deception and its stockpile of weapons”.284

687. The Government’s focus on this issue intensified in early 2003 with the failure to

find evidence of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear programmes.

688. The decision to include provision for interviews inside and outside Iraq in resolution

1441 (2002), and the subsequent discussion about the conduct of such interviews, are

described in Sections 3.5 to 3.8. These Sections show the UK recognised that a policy

of interviews outside Iraq would be difficult to implement.

689. Dr Blix had initially expressed reservations about interviewing Iraqi personnel

outside Iraq but on 7 March he told the Security Council that he would be requesting

such interviews “shortly”.

690. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that Saddam Hussein:

“… was deliberately concealing documentation, and … he was deliberately not

allowing people to be interviewed properly.

“In December 2002 … we received information, and this information remains valid,

that Saddam called together his key people and said that anybody who agreed to an

interview outside of Iraq was to be treated a spy.”285

691. Mr Blair added:

“… the reason for that is very simple, and it emerges from the Iraq Survey Group

report. He retained full intent to restart his programme, and, therefore, it was very

important for him that interviews did not take place, because the interviews with

senior regime members were precisely what would have indicated the concealment

and the intent.”286

284 Minutes, Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), 4 March 2003, [Evidence Session].

285 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, page 104.

286 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 104-105.

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