The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
including
on time.” He subsequently told Sir Jeremy that President Lagos had
told
President
Bush that “he wanted 45 days and a second Council
decision”.
257.
Sir Jeremy
concluded that the draft resolution tabled by the UK, US and
Spain
on
7 March had “no chance … of adoption”. The UK now faced “a
choice between a
number of
hard options”:
•
A “light”
resolution without the deadline for a decision on whether Iraq had
failed
to take the
final opportunity and no benchmarks. That would “allow each
Council
member to
interpret the text as they see fit” but had “considerable legal
risks …
as well as
appearing too obviously as cover for US military
action”.
•
A “light”
resolution accompanied by “Blix-cleared benchmarks” while
saying
“we were
going the last mile for peace”. But Dr Blix and
Dr Perricos “did not
think the
benchmarks would necessarily be strong enough to amount to
a
‘strategic
change’ by Iraq”. There would be a “difficult choice of what to do
if
the
benchmarks were met … especially if we believed … that Iraq was
still not
serious
about complete disarmament”.
•
A “light”
resolution accompanied by “stronger benchmarks”. Sir Jeremy
thought
that
Dr Blix might regard the UK list as “unreasonable for
completion in the
timescale
that we envisage”. He was inclined to chose a “Blix-approved
version
if (if) we
can bring the US along”.
•
No
resolution with or without national benchmarks.
258.
Sir Jeremy
commented that the FCO would:
“… wish to
consider the legal implications of each of these options. If we won
an
adopted
resolution under [the second or third] options … we would have to
live with
the
(improbable?) consequences of Saddam meeting the requirements, even
if the
US was not
in the same position.”
“If we do
not look like winning adoption, it might be easier to make our
legal case
if no
resolution is put to the vote … we could presumably still argue
that 1441 had
found Iraq
to be in material breach and offered it a final opportunity; that
it was now
objectively
clear on the basis of the Blix reports and other emerging evidence,
that
Iraq had
failed to take the final opportunity; and that therefore the
authorisation in
678 [1990]
was revived.
“To the
objection that we should have tested the Council we would reply (a)
that a
Council
decision was not needed under 1441 … and (b) that putting the text
to the
vote would
have been futile in the circumstances, in particular because of
publicly
stated
French intransigence.
“If a
resolution was put to the vote and defeated, or adopted with a
majority of
antagonistic
EOVs [Explanations of Vote], it would seem harder (than it
already
444