The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
establish
clear Ministerial oversight of post‑conflict strategy, planning
and
preparation;
•
ensure that
Ministers took the decisions needed to prepare a flexible,
realistic
and fully
resourced plan integrating UK military and civilian
contributions;
•
seek
adequate assurances that the UK was in a position to meet its
likely
obligations
in Iraq;
•
insist that
the UK’s strategic objectives for Iraq were tested
against
anything
other than the best case: a well‑planned and executed US‑led
and
UN‑authorised
post‑conflict operation in a relatively benign security
environment;
•
press
President Bush for definitive assurances about US post‑conflict
plans
or set out
clearly to him the strategic risk in underestimating the
post‑conflict
challenge
and failing adequately to prepare for the task; or
•
consider,
or seek advice on, whether the absence of a satisfactory plan
was
a
sufficient threat to UK strategic objectives to require a
reassessment of the
terms of
the UK engagement in Iraq. Despite concerns about the state of
US
planning,
he did not make agreement on a satisfactory post‑conflict plan
a
condition
of UK participation in military action.
635.
In the weeks
immediately following the invasion, Mr Blair’s omissions made
it more
difficult
for the UK Government to take an informed decision on the
establishment of
the UK’s
post‑conflict Area of Responsibility (AOR) in southern Iraq
(addressed in more
detail in
Section 8).
636.
In the short
to medium term, his omissions increased the risk that the UK
would
be unable
to respond to the unexpected in Iraq.
637.
In the longer
term, they reduced the likelihood of achieving the UK’s
strategic
objectives
in Iraq.
638.
As described
in Section 8, UK forces entered Basra City on the night of
6/7 April
2003 and
rapidly gained control, meeting less resistance than anticipated.
Once
the city
was under its control, the UK was responsible, as the Occupying
Power, for
maintenance
of law and order. Within its predominantly Shia Area of Operations,
the
UK assumed
that risks to Coalition Forces would be lower than in the so‑called
“Sunni
triangle”
controlled by the US.
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