The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
precisely
at regime and military targets. Precision weapons would be used to
minimise
civilian
damage and casualties.
103.
Mr Blair
concluded that Saddam Hussein’s strategy would be to try to draw
the
Coalition
into the cities to maximise civilian casualties and generate a
“clamour” for
military
action to cease. “In extremis”, Saddam Hussein would probably use
chemical
and
biological weapons, some of which it was believed were deployed
with Iraqi forces.
104.
In their
conversation at 1600 on 20 March, Mr Blair and President Bush
discussed
the
previous night’s events, the possibility of “catastrophic success”
in the event of a
sudden
“melt-down” of Saddam Hussein’s regime, followed by reprisals by
locals against
the Ba’ath
Party.64
They also
discussed their planned meeting at Camp David.
105.
In a statement
to the House of Commons that afternoon, Mr Hoon
said:
“President
Bush announced at 3.15 this morning on behalf of the Coalition
that
operations
had begun with attacks on selected targets of military
importance.
Those attacks
were carried out by Coalition aircraft and cruise missiles on
more
than one
target in the vicinity of Baghdad, following information relating
to the
whereabouts
of very senior members of the Iraqi leadership. Those leaders are
at
the very
heart of Iraq’s command and control system, responsible for
directing Iraq’s
weapons of
mass destruction …
“In
addition to those attacks, Coalition Forces yesterday carried out
certain
preliminary
operations against Iraqi artillery, surface-to-surface missiles,
and air
defence
systems … Those were prudent preparatory steps … designed to
reduce
the threat
to Coalition Forces in Kuwait …
“British
forces are already engaged in certain military operations, although
the
House will
understand why I cannot give further details at this
stage.” 65
106.
Mr Hoon
warned that the Government would not provide a “running
commentary”
on events
during military operations, but oral statements would be made “as
and when
necessary”
and summaries would be placed in the Library of the House of
Commons
and the
Vote Office “as warranted by the day’s events”.
107.
In his
statement, Mr Hoon said that he would place a copy of the
Government’s
military
campaign objectives in the Library of the House of Commons later
that day.
108.
The document,
which had been approved by Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney
General
(see
Section 6.2), said that the UK’s overall objective for the military
campaign was:
“… to
create the conditions in which Iraq disarms in accordance with its
obligations
under
UNSCRs and remains so disarmed in the long term.” 66
64
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
conversation with Bush’.
65
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20 March
2003, columns 1087-1088.
66
Paper, 18
March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.
20