The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
prison,
this led many of the Inquiry’s witnesses to conclude that the
spring of 2004 was
a turning
point, as described in Section 9.8.
72.
In April,
weaknesses in the ICDC and IPS were exposed as a result of
uprisings
in Fallujah
and Najaf. Some officers abandoned their posts and aided the
insurgency.
Others
mutinied when they came under fire.
73.
The ICDC was
affected worst of all. 12,000 members deserted within two
weeks.
Consideration
was given to re‑engaging military officers dismissed under the
policy of
de‑Ba’athification
(see Section 11.1). Ambassador Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy
to
Iraq and
Head of the CPA, maintained that the de‑Ba’thification policy was
correct, but
had been
poorly implemented. Mr Blair told President Bush that the
Coalition needed to
do
“whatever it takes”41
to get the
ICDC and police into shape. He added: “I’m not sure
we really
have our entire system focused on this; and it needs to
be”.
74.
Mr Blair
held a meeting with Ministers and senior officials on 13 May to
discuss
security in
Iraq. He expressed a clear view that there were two key issues in
Iraq: the
political
process and security, of which security was
“fundamental”.42
After the
transfer of
sovereignty,
Mr Blair felt that the Iraqis would be reluctant to ask the
Coalition to manage
security
for them and this “put a real premium on building capacity
urgently”.
75.
At
Mr Blair’s request, a team led by Major General Nicholas
Houghton, Assistant
Chief of
the Defence Staff (Operations), visited Iraq from 20 to 23 May to
see what could
be done to
speed up Iraqiisation of the security sector.
76.
Maj
Gen Houghton’s frank assessment identified issues that should
already
have been
clear to Ministers and officials. He noted the lack of strategy,
“bureaucratic
complexity”43
hindering
access to funds and resources, “initiative overload” and
a
short‑term
focus. He stated that the concept of acceleration was “misplaced”.
It was
“‘Sustained
Effort”, with some change in emphasis, that would produce the
desired
capability.
He highlighted the need for “honest acceptance” of the likely
timescales.
77.
Maj
Gen Houghton assessed that:
“The
biggest single thing that will move the creation of capability
forward is the
increased
use of military and police assets in mentoring roles. This should
involve,
for
example, widening the concept of embedding troops within ICDC
Units. Given
available
assets this will mean taking risk on maintaining
security.”
78.
Maj
Gen Houghton judged that an SSR strategy must be “authored,
owned and
executed”
in Iraq, not in London.
41
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 26 April 2004 attaching
Note from PM for President Bush.
42
Letter
Bowen to Baker, 13 May 2004, ‘Iraq: security’.
43
Minute
ACDS(Ops) to Rycroft, 25 May 2004, ‘How Best to Progress the
Iraqiisation of the
Security Sector’.
428