The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The JIC
stated that, while there would be competing demands for resources
if sanctions
were
lifted, “Saddam and any likely successor are likely to give
high
priority”
to
“restoring
military capability”. The JIC
continued:
“It would
take comparatively less investment to revive some of Iraq’s
WMD
programmes.
Although Saddam is unlikely to use such weapons, their
development
as a means
of coercive diplomacy would give him an additional political tool
to use in
his
attempts to re-establish his regional and international
standing.”
64.
Sir
Christopher Meyer, British Ambassader to the US from 1997 to 2003,
told the
Inquiry
that, on 6 December 2000, he met Dr Condoleezza Rice and,
separately,
Mr Karl
Rove to discuss the priorities of the new US
Administration.42
Dr Rice
would
become
President Bush’s National Security Advisor and Mr Rove would become
one of
President
Bush’s Senior Advisors.
65.
Sir
Christopher told the Inquiry that nuclear missile defence was at
the top
of the US
list of priorities, with Iraq and the wider Middle East some way
down.
Sir Christopher
described the US position on Iraq as:
“We need to
look at this. Things aren’t going well. The policy of sanctions
is
in tatters,
the smuggling, Saddam is getting away with blue murder. We
need
to do
something …”
66.
Mr Cook
agreed with Mr Blair that full implementation of resolution
1284
remained
the UK’s best option and suggested that the UK should
support
efforts to
clarify the ambiguities in the resolution concerning the process
for
lifting
sanctions.
67.
Mr Cook’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Sawers on 15 December, setting
out
Mr Cook’s
views.43
Mr Cook
agreed that full implementation of resolution 1284
remained
“the best means of pursuing the UK’s policy objectives”. It would
restore
in-country
control over Iraq’s WMD programmes, “get us off the hook of
responsibility
for the
humanitarian situation”, and provide Iraq and the UK with an exit
route
from
sanctions.
68.
The “shelf
life” of the resolution, however, was limited.
69.
If Iraq was to
be persuaded to comply with resolution 1284, it was “now clear
that
this will
require the elaboration of a package of measures which is
sufficiently attractive
to lure the
Iraqis in”. France had recently proposed that the P5 should begin
to clarify
the
“ambiguities” in resolution 1284, in particular those concerning
the process for
lifting
sanctions. The timing was not ideal (between US Administrations),
but a package
that had
the support of the P5 would be hard for Iraq to ignore. Reaching
agreement
42
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, pages 4-5.
43
Letter
Barrow to Sawers, 15 December 2000, ‘Iraq’.
204