6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
54.
The SPG stated
that the UK was “highly unlikely to be able to deploy a
conventional
land force
through Turkey”. If the UK wanted to contribute land forces which
would meet
the US
planning timetable, a reassessment of the force packages was
necessary.
55.
The paper
recorded that early work on a “Winning Concept” had “illustrated”
that
a military
campaign to achieve the UK’s strategic goals would need to be
“quick and
successful”.
The uncertainty over Turkey raised questions about whether the
military
plan would
be able to achieve the effects in the North which the SPG
considered
remained
central to delivering a winning concept. If they were not achieved,
forces
operating
in the South were “likely to be at greater risk” of:
•
chemical
warfare (CW)/biological warfare (BW) attack;
•
stiffer
conventional resistance; and
•
potential
unconventional operations/civilian resistance.
56.
The preferred
role for the UK in the South would be to provide a “relief in
place
for US
forces in the early phases of a campaign” to release US combat
forces to fulfil
other
tasks.
57.
In the time
available, the UK could generate four possible force
packages:
•
the
Amphibious Task Group (ATG);
•
the ATG and
an armoured brigade;
•
the ATG and
a light brigade; and
•
the ATG and
both an armoured and a light brigade.
58.
The SPG
advised that, if the UK committed to a southern option over and
above the
ATG, it
would “demonstrate UK commitment to all phases” of an operation and
“crucially
in the
aftermath”. That would provide Ministers with “additional leverage”
in the planning
phases.
Further commitment to US planning and operational effort would make
UK
forces
“integral to success in current US concept”. The UK would,
therefore, “gain a
potential
veto, but exercising it would strain UK/US relations for some time
to come”.
59.
The SPG also
stated that US combat power would deliver military success,
but
strategic
victory would be “successful delivery of aftermath and limiting
unintended
consequences”.
60.
Adopting a
southern option had the potential to:
“Provide UK
with leading role in key areas of Iraq (free of Kurdish political
risks)
in
aftermath, and thus provide leverage in aftermath planning efforts,
especially
related to:
–
Humanitarian effort
–
Reconstruction of key infrastructure
– Future
control and distribution of Iraqi oil.”
395