6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
“Following
further military-to-military discussions in theatre, the Defence
Secretary
[Mr Hoon]
believes that it is timely to take stock of the US plan and take
decisions
on the
further development of the UK role within it.”
596.
Mr Watkins
wrote that the original US plan envisaged the US 4th Infantry
Division
seizing the
Kirkuk oilfields, but that plan had been “compromised by Turkish
delays”.
The US
plan in the North therefore remained “fragile”.
597.
Mr Watkins
advised that the commitment of specialist NBC, engineering
and
bridging
capabilities “would reinforce key gaps in US capability and
facilitate a rapid US
advance,
without detriment to the tasks required of UK forces in our Area of
Operations”.
598.
On the
expansion of the UK AO northwards, Mr Watkins
explained:
“The US
Land Component Commander has … developed a plan that would
expand
the UK Area
of Operations by up to 150km up to and beyond al-Amara [in
Maysan
province]
(but short of al-Kut [in Wasit province]) …
“The case
for pushing a UK formation northwards will ultimately have to be
judged
at the
time. Clearly it will depend to some extent on what is happening in
the
Basra area.
It is also the case that an exemplary Phase IV operation depends
on
a
satisfactory conclusion to the conflict phase. The Defence
Secretary therefore
judges that
the senior UK operational commander (the Chief of Joint
Operations
[Lt Gen
Reith]) should be authorised to expand the Phase III Area of
Operations
northwards
if that is required to achieve a satisfactory outcome to Phase III.
The
focus for
the UK in Phase IV should, however, remain the South-Eastern Area
of
Operations
as currently understood.”
599.
Mr Watkins
explained that, given delays in the deployment of some US
forces,
there were
certain scenarios in which the US might need the additional combat
power
that the UK
land component could provide:
“In
circumstances where the situation in the UK’s existing Area of
Operations was
benign, and
where Iraqi forces had generally collapsed, it might be possible
for
1 (UK)
Division to provide forces to contribute to decisive US
action in addition
to
the
specialist contributions and the northward expansion described
above. The
Defence
Secretary believes that the Chief of Joint Operations should be
authorised
to
participate in planning discussions with the US without commitment,
and on the
understanding
that any decision to commit UK forces to reinforce the US in
decisive
action
would be a matter for Ministers.”
600.
Mr Watkins
explained that, on that basis, Mr Hoon judged:
•
The “first
priority” should be for the UK to confirm its willingness to
contribute
specialist
capabilities to facilitate the US advance from the
South.
•
Second,
“provided that UK commanders judge[d] this sensible in
the
circumstances
at the time”, the UK should be “forward-leaning” on
the
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