The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
535.
Ambassador
Negroponte stated that the Council was meeting “to publicly
discuss
the message
that the Security Council will send to Iraq and … Saddam
Hussein”.
The US
view had been clear since 12 September; there could
be:
“… no more
business as usual or toothless resolutions that Iraq will continue
to
ignore. Our
intent is that the Council should meet the challenge and stand
firm,
resolute,
and united in adopting a draft resolution that holds Iraq to its
commitments,
lays out
clearly what Iraq must do to comply and states that there will
be
consequences
if Iraq refuses to do so.”
536.
The US
expected the Council to act, and that when it adopted a resolution
which
sent “a
clear and united message to Iraq that it must fulfil its
obligations”, Iraq would
have a
choice “whether to take this last chance to comply”. The US hoped
Iraq would
comply, but
if it did not, the US would “seek compliance and disarmament by
other
means”.
537.
Addressing the
role of the UN, Ambassador Negroponte described the
world’s
“united
response” to Iraq’s aggression in 1990 and 1991 and the resolutions
passed by
the
Security Council as “unique and ground‑breaking”, which “brought
the world body
closest to
the visions of its founders”. But in the ensuing 10 years, Iraq’s
“failure to
implement”
the “peace terms” had become “a question of enormous significance”.
The
challenge
was whether the UN could “perform the function its founders
envisaged”.
538.
The US hoped
the answer would be “Yes”. Since 12 September it had “seen
signs
of emerging
Council unity during intensive discussions here and in capitals”.
But it had
“also seen
clear signs” that Iraq was “reverting to form”, including inviting
inspectors to
return
without conditions, then placing conditions, and responding to
UNMOVIC and
IAEA
requests for clarity with “obfuscation and multiple answers”. Iraq
had shown it
hoped “to
return to the word games, ephemeral commitments and misdirection of
the
past, while
continuing to develop the world’s deadliest weapons”. That was “why
a clear,
firm
message from the Council was so important”.
539.
The Council
and the UN membership would do “no favour” to the people of
Iraq,
the
countries of the region or the credibility of the UN if they
created “the impression
that an
outcome in which Iraq retains its chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons
programmes
is an acceptable or possible outcome”. A consensus had been forming
in
the Council
that “the time for denial, deception and delay” had “come to an end
and that
Iraq must
be verifiably disarmed”. There was “a growing agreement that there
must be
immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted inspections of all Iraqi facilities
that may have
a role in
the development of weapons of mass destruction”.
540.
Ambassador
Negroponte stated that the US and UK had shared “the
elements
of our
vision of a resolution that will address Iraq’s material breach of
its obligations …
specify the
types of access and authorities that UNMOVIC and IAEA must have to
be
able
effectively to verify Iraqi disarmament, make clear Iraq’s
obligations and articulate
to Iraq
that there will be consequences to non‑compliance” with other
members of
296