3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
in our
presence”. There was “still time” for that. There was “no way the
inspectors” could
“close a
file by simply invoking the precept that Iraq cannot prove the
negative”. In “such
cases”, the
inspectors “must conclude, as they have done in the past, that the
absence
of the
particular item is not assured”.
483.
Dr Blix
listed a series of inconsistencies between the declaration and
earlier Iraqi
declarations
which had been described as full, final and complete, in addition
to the
issues he
had highlighted on 19 December, including in relation to special
munitions,
imports of
missile engines and solid missile fuel and VX. He also stated that
UNMOVIC
did not
feel that Iraq had “made a serious effort” to provide lists of
personnel engaged
in proscribed
programmes.
484.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that good progress had been made in
re‑establishing
knowledge
of Iraq’s capabilities and that “no evidence of ongoing
prohibited
nuclear‑related
activities” had been detected and the IAEA’s verification
activities
were “an
important deterrent to the resumption of such
activities”.165
485.
Further work
would be necessary before the IAEA could draw
definitive
conclusions,
including in relation to reports of Iraqi attempts to import
uranium after
1991, the
relocation and consumption of dual‑use materials, and the attempted
purchase
of
prohibited aluminium tubes, which appeared to be “consistent with
the reverse
engineering
of rockets” and “not directly suitable” for the manufacture of
centrifuges.
Dr ElBaradei
emphasised the importance of active co‑operation from
Iraq.
486.
A press
statement issued by the President of the Security Council stated
that
the members
had “listened with the utmost attention and interest”; and that
they had
“reiterated
their full support for the work and action of Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei and
to the
continuation of inspection activities”.166
487.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that the discussion had been “relatively
low
key”.
Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei had made “clear that the Iraqi
declaration is inadequate
and that
Iraq needs to co‑operate more pro‑actively”.167
There had
been more than
250 inspections
at more than 200 sites. Sir Jeremy had noted that Iraqi
co‑operation
in giving
access was “satisfactory”, but “more passive than active”. Iraq had
to be
pro‑active
to prove it had no WMD. He had “hoped the pace could
accelerate”.
488.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that Ambassador John Negroponte, US
Permanent
Representative
to the UN, had again described the Iraqi declaration as a material
breach
and stated
that a continued failure to co‑operate actively would constitute a
further one.
165
IAEA
Newscenter, 9 January 2003, Status of
the Agency’s Verification Activities in Iraq
as of 8
January 2003.
166
UN Press
Statement, 9 January 2003, Press
Statement on Iraq by Security Council President
(SC/7628).
167
Telegram 35
UKMIS New York to FCO London, 10 January 2003, ‘Iraq: 9 January
Council Discussion’.
87