The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
6.
The Protected
Patrol Vehicle (PPV) Working Group discussed how to meet
that
requirement
on 5 September 2003. It was clear that the MOD had few options for
the
rapid
supply of an armoured 4x4 vehicle. Large numbers of Snatch Land
Rovers were
already in
service in Northern Ireland and were therefore available for
deployment.
There was
no other vehicle that could be readily deployed without
modification or
without considerable
cost. The MOD therefore decided to dispatch 180 Snatch
Land
Rovers to
Iraq.
7.
Several
witnesses to the Inquiry referred to working with “what you’ve got”
and told
the Inquiry
that the Snatch Land Rover was preferable to a completely
unprotected
vehicle.
The Snatch Land Rover had not been designed, however, for the
conditions
found in
Iraq; and by 2002 it was at the end of its planned life in service.
No programme
to replace
it had been agreed.
8.
The Snatch
Land Rover was therefore not an optimal solution to the
urgent
requirement
for an armoured PPV, but was the best available stop‑gap. Given
the
need for
rapid replacement of completely unprotected vehicles, the decision
to
deploy
180 Snatch Land Rovers was fully justifiable. However; this
should have been
recognised
as no more than an interim solution. Work to find a more effective
vehicle
for Iraq
and similar environments in the longer term should have been put in
hand.
9.
The Snatch
Land Rover was modernised and made more suitable for the
weather
and terrain
of Iraq in several conversion programmes. Because the chassis
was
incapable
of carrying the weight of additional armour the enhancements which
could
be made
to its level of physical protection were limited.
10.
The hardening
of a vehicle, or any other type of equipment, is only one
component
of its
protection. Throughout Operation TELIC, the UK also deployed a
suite of
other
measures to counter the IED threat, including aerial surveillance,
electronic
countermeasures,
the deployment and up‑armouring of heavier tracked vehicles,
tactical
changes and
intelligence‑based targeting of the perpetrators.
11.
The first IED
attack using an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) took place
in
May 2004.
In July 2004, the Defence Intelligence Staff stated that the
presence and
use of EFPs
in attacks against the Multi‑National Force in Iraq was “a
significant force
12.
The MOD’s
Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC) concluded in February
2005
that the
Snatch Land Rover conversion programme had been “a belated
reaction” to the
IED threat
and that sustained investment was necessary to “provide sufficient
protected
mobility
for operations in hostile environments such as
Iraq”.6
5
Report DIS,
26 July 2004, ‘Further Evidence of Lebanese Hizballah produced
weapons in Iraq’.
6
Report DOC,
22 February 2005, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Vol.
2’.
230