The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
216.
During the
debate, Ms Short reported that the US had committed to fund in
full the
recent UN
appeal for US$137m to enable UN agencies to prepare their responses
to a
217.
In response to
a question from Mr Crispin Blunt about the resources available
to
DFID,
Ms Short stated that:
“… the UK’s
contribution to any humanitarian crisis throughout the world,
as
determined
by the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and
Development,
is just over
5 percent – that is all.”
Ms Short
continued:
“… my
department’s budget has virtually doubled since 1997, but is under
strain …
We have a
Contingency Reserve and Iraq would be prioritised. However, I have
just
been in
Africa, where there is a real fear about resources being taken away
from
southern
Africa, the horn of Africa, the Afghan people, the West Bank and
Gaza –
that would
be wrong and we would not contemplate it. We will play our part in
the
international
system, but the department is not flush with resources – I must
frankly
warn the
House that they are short.”
218.
On 31 January,
a DFID official provided advice to Ms Short, at her request,
on how
much the UK
might be expected to contribute to “humanitarian
relief/reconstruction” in
Iraq in the
event of military action.140
219.
The official
provided a draft DFID paper which considered in detail Iraq’s
possible
post‑war
needs under a number of scenarios. The paper used current
Oil‑for‑Food
(OFF)
programme expenditure plans as a “benchmark” for a future
humanitarian and
reconstruction
programme, and then considered how those plans would be
affected
by a number
of factors including the nature of any conflict, the availability
of Iraqi oil
revenues,
and how Iraq’s external debt and reparation claims would be
resolved.
220.
The official
advised that FCO and Treasury officials had seen an earlier draft
of
the paper,
and that the Treasury was using roughly similar figures in
assessing the total
cost to the
UK of military engagement in Iraq (an issue in which there was
increased
Ministerial
interest).
221.
In her
covering minute, the official summarised the main conclusions of
the paper:
•
Total
humanitarian costs could reach US$12bn in the first year after any
conflict,
if the OFF
programme collapsed.
139
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 30
January 2003, columns 1057‑1058.
140
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 31 January 2003,
‘Iraq: Cost of
Humanitarian
Relief/Reconstruction and Potential UK Contribution’ attaching
Paper DFID [draft], [undated],
‘Draft:
Iraq: Relief and Reconstruction: Implications for UK
Government’.
478