The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
199.
Concerns
were already being expressed in discussions between
the
US and UK
about whether, in the face of Iraq’s deception and
concealment
activities,
the inspections would be able to find evidence of a material breach
–
a “smoking gun”.
200.
The UK
sought to persuade the US not to make snap judgements on
the
declaration
and to allow Dr Blix to make the first formal
response.
201.
On 29
November, in response to a request from Sir David Manning,
Mr Straw’s
Private
Office provided advice on handling the Iraqi
declaration.63
202.
The FCO
advised that Iraq could maintain it had “no WMD and defy
UNMOVIC/
IAEA to
prove them wrong, confident that they can conceal the programmes
uncovered
by UNSCOM
in 1998”, but the expectation was that it would be “more
subtle:
declaring
very large quantities of dual‑use items and programmes and
reiterating
all …
past declarations. In both cases our assumption is that they will
continue to hide
programmes …”
203.
Dr ElBaradei
had suggested that the nuclear declaration was “likely to
contain
information
that would be of use to proliferators”; and that it should not be
circulated to
the Council
as a whole. Resolution 1441 required Iraq to provide the
declaration to the
inspectors
and the Council.
204.
The FCO
anticipated that the US might “plan to rush out its own analysis
(and
probable
dismissal) of the document in very short order” and advised that
any immediate
criticism
of a lengthy and technical declaration would be likely to be
regarded as
“evidence
of a determination to pursue military action regardless”. It might
also lead
to requests
for evidence which might not be releasable or would alert Iraq to
potential
inspections.
205.
The FCO
expected the US to focus on seven areas in the
declaration:
•
ballistic
missiles;
•
biological
programmes;
•
chemical
programmes;
•
an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programme intended to deliver chemical
and
biological
warfare (CBW) agents;
•
mobile WMD
facilities;
•
the
outstanding discrepancies in relation to CBW munitions;
and
•
the
procurement of aluminium tubes.
206.
The FCO
advised that it would be best to “delay giving a definitive
response until
we have
been able to assess the content, while expressing a healthy
scepticism based
63
Letter
Sinclair to Manning, 29 November 2002, ‘Iraq: 8 December
Declaration’.
38